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                                                                Abstract 
Market Structure in Banking and the Bank Lending Channel: Evidence from the Bank-
level Data in Asian and Latin American Countries 
 Yuan Li  
 Maria Olivero Ph.D. (Co-chair supervisor) 
            Bang Nam Jeon Ph.D. (Co-chair supervisor)  
 
 
 The market structure of the global banking sector has changed dramatically in 
recent years. Since the mid-1990s, Asian and Latin American countries have 
experienced deregulation, foreign bank penetration, and an accelerated process of 
consolidation and competition in the banking sector. This thesis examines how the 
recent changes in concentration and competition in Asian and Latin American banking 
sectors have affected the monetary policy transmission mechanism, while specifically 
focusing on the bank lending channel.  
The first essay examines the relationship between increased consolidation in 
banking and the bank lending channel of monetary policy in 20 Asian and Latin 
American countries, using  unique bank-level panel data for the period from 1996 to 
2006. The estimation results provide consistent evidence that as concentration in 
banking increases, the bank lending channel weakens, causing monetary policy to be 
less effective. This is found to be true even after accounting for the effects brought by 
changes in loan demand and financial constraints faced by individual banks of varying 
size, liquidity and capitalization. To my knowledge, this study is the first to use bank-
level balance sheets and income statement data to study this issue at a global scale. 
Doing so enables this study to contribute to the literature in two different ways. First, 
the effects of the supply-side bank lending channel from those of the demand-side 
interest rate channel can be identified more accurately. Second, any systematic 
xiii 
 
 
differences in the impact of consolidation in banking on the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism across banks of different types and levels of financial 
strength can be tested properly. This essay also discusses potential explanations for the 
findings that increased consolidation reduces the sensitivity of bank lending to 
changes in monetary policy shocks. 
The second essay examines the evolution of banking competition and how 
banking competition affects the transmission of monetary policy through the bank 
lending channel. I use annual bank-level panel data for commercial banks of 10 Asian 
and 10 Latin American countries from 1996 to 2006. A two-step estimation procedure 
is applied. In the first step, the degree of banking competition in each country and year 
is measured using the methodology proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987). The result 
shows that the banking sector in these emerging economies has experienced a 
significant increase in competition. In the second step, the empirical results on the loan 
equation provide consistent evidence that increase in banking sector competition has 
weakened the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel in the 
Asian and Latin American countries. It is found that overall, banking competition is 
higher in Latin America than in Asia and the bank lending channel is weaker in Latin 
America than in Asia. 
The third essay investigates the relationship between banking concentration 
and competition. According to the traditional structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm, greater concentration results in less competition in the banking industry. On 
the contrary, the efficiency structure hypothesis indicates that higher concentration 
may cause banks to become more efficient and competitive. Additional factors such as 
xiv 
 
 
foreign bank penetration, information technology, and asymmetric information may 
also affect banking competition. Furthermore, the measurement issue could also 
contribute to the contradictory relationship between the two. In the literature, banking 
concentration is measured as the market share held by the largest banks using the 
Herfindahl index, the concentration ratio CR3 (the largest 3 banks share of assets) and 
CR5 (the largest 5 banks share of assets), while banking competition is often measured 
as a bank’s ability to affect the price in the market for bank loans using the Panzar and 
Rosse approach. This paper studies this issue empirically using aggregate panel data 
on the banking industry and macroeconomic environments from a total of 14 Asian 
and Latin American countries during the period from 1996 to 2006. The empirical 
results provide evidence that banking concentration reduces banking competition in 
the Asian and Latin American countries for our sample period.  
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Chapter1: Consolidation in Banking and the Bank Lending Channel of Monetary                                              
Policy: Evidence from Asia and Latin America 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
A significant increase in consolidation in the banking industry has been one of 
the most important characteristics of financial development in emerging economies in 
recent years. For example, the three-firm concentration ratio, defined as the share of 
total assets held by the three largest banks in the industry, increased from 0.35 in 1996 
to 0.6 in 2006 in Brazil; from 0.55 to 0.65 in Mexico; from 0.65 to 0.85 in Hong 
Kong; from 0.35 to 0.55 in Indonesia; from 0.6 to 0.9 in Singapore; and from 0.25 to 
0.5 in Korea. We have seen this hold true for the developed world, as the current 
financial crisis in the United States is also leading to an important increase in 
consolidation.  
A topic of special interest to both bankers and policy makers has been whether 
this financial sector consolidation can affect the environment in which monetary 
policy decisions are made, and how its effects are transmitted to the rest of the 
economy (see “Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector,” Group of Ten, 2001). 
Despite the importance of this topic, with the exception of Adams and Amel (2005), 
little research has been done on the relationship between consolidation in banking and 
the sensitivity of bank lending to monetary policy. 
This paper fills the gap by studying the role played by consolidation in banking 
on the effectiveness of monetary policy, focusing on the bank lending channel as the 
transmission mechanism. The goal is to study whether consolidation in banking 
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amplifies or reduces the impact of a given change in monetary policy on bank lending. 
Bernanke and Blinder’s (1988) model of the bank lending channel suggests that open 
market sales of securities by a monetary authority drain reserves, reduce deposits from 
the banking system, so limit the supply of bank loans due to banks’ less access to 
loanable funds. This effect, transmitted through the level and composition of bank 
assets, is above the traditional (IS-LM) money supply and interest-rate effects. As a 
result of a monetary policy tightening, money supply decreases, bank deposits and 
bank reserves fall, which forces banks to rely more on managed liabilities. Also the 
banks’ relative cost of funds increases and the supply of bank loans decreases. The 
reduction of loans supply may be even larger- particularly in the short run than the 
reduction in the demand of loanable funds. Therefore, a gap would arise between the 
supply and demand for funds. Banks have to increase the wedge between capital 
market interest rates and the rates they charge their borrowers. This in turn raises the 
cost of funding for firms and consequently the investment and output are negatively 
affected if firms are not able to switch to an alternative financing source in capital 
markets.  
From a monetary policy perspective, the impact of banking concentration is 
especially important, which directly affects the effectiveness of the central bank’s 
monetary policy implementation. There are several different ways in which 
consolidation in the banking sector can have an impact on the effectiveness of the 
bank lending channel as a transmission mechanism of monetary policy.  
First, consolidation raises the market share held by large banks. With lending 
by these banks typically being less sensitive to monetary policy shocks than lending 
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by smaller institutions1
Second, consolidation may allow stronger and financially healthier banks to 
take over weaker ones. This takeover should improve access to alternative sources of 
funds for the banking sector as a whole, so that it is able to partially isolate the supply 
of credit from negative shocks to reserves
, consolidation can weaken the bank lending channel of 
monetary policy transmission.  
2
Third, if increased consolidation reduces competition in the interbank market, 
some banks might try to exploit their larger market power or greater knowledge of 
liquidity conditions, and this can lead to higher costs of liquidity for other market 
participants. Higher costs of liquidity make it more difficult for banks to isolate their 
supply of loans from the adverse shock to their reserves arising from a negative 
monetary shock. Therefore, this potential impact of consolidation on the cost of 
liquidity for non-consolidated banks can strengthen the bank lending channel (see 
Group of Ten (2001) report for a discussion of this argument). 
. Through this effect, consolidation can 
weaken the bank lending channel. 
Fourth, increased consolidation can result in larger banks with an informational 
monopoly over their customers’ creditworthiness and therefore, in higher switching 
costs for borrowers. Then, with firms finding it more costly to switch among lenders, 
                                                   
1 It is well accepted that banks of different size respond differently to monetary shocks. This happens 
mainly for two reasons. First, small banks often have simpler capital structures and finance their loans 
mostly through transaction and savings deposits. When the money supply shrinks, these less liquid 
banks are not able to maintain their loan supply by resorting to alternative sources of fund for loan, such 
as cash or securities. Second, smaller banks have larger costs of dealing with the informational 
asymmetries involved in raising uninsured funds to finance their lending (see Peltzman (1969)). 
 
2 It is well accepted that less capitalized banks find it more difficult to obtain funding through capital 
markets to protect their loan portfolios (see Kashyap and Stein (1995, 1997 and 2000), Favero et al. 
(1999) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) among others). 
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the excess demand left by small banks that are more severely affected by a 
contractionary monetary policy cannot be picked up by large banks which are better 
able to protect their loan supply from the adverse monetary shock. This could raise the 
effect of a given reduction in the supply of credit on economic activity, and strengthen 
the bank lending channel3
It is not clear which of these effects is dominant. Therefore, consolidation in 
the banking industry may amplify or reduce the impact of a given change in the policy 
interest rate on economic activity, which strengths or weakens the bank lending 
channel as the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. An empirical assessment 
of this impact is of particular interest at a time when the world financial crisis is 
forcing significant consolidation in the banking industry, while monetary policy is 
being heavily used to fight recessions around the world. 
. 
No research exists on the effects of local banking concentration on the 
sensitivity of bank lending to monetary policy in Asian and Latin American countries. 
These studies on this topic focus mostly on the United States so far. This paper is the 
first to use bank-level data to study how consolidation in banking has affected the way 
in which monetary policy affects bank lending at a global scale. In this paper, the 
                                                   
3 Klemperer (1995) summarizes the theoretical literature on switching costs, and Northcott (2004) 
discusses how the presence of switching costs affects market structure and contestability in the banking 
industry. Greenbaum, Kanatas and Venezia (1989) and Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003) provide theoretical 
models of switching costs in banking. Several empirical papers document the importance of switching 
costs in the banking industry (see Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002), Shy (2002), Kim, Kliger and Vale 
(2003), Santos and Winton (2008) and Hale and Santos (forthcoming), among others). Santos and 
Winton (2008) use micro loan data and find that bank-dependent firms without accessibility to public 
debt market pay significantly higher loan rates than those firms with the accessibility, implying that 
banks take advantage of their information monopoly. Third, Hale and Santos (forthcoming) show that 
firms are able to borrow from banks at lower interest rates after they issue for the first time in the public 
bond market. They interpret this finding as evidence that banks do indeed price their informational 
monopoly. 
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empirical results show that the effectiveness of monetary policy is inversely related to 
the concentration in the banking sector. I use microeconomic bank-level data instead 
of macroeconomic data, because macroeconomic time series are not appropriate for 
identifying the supply side bank lending channel from the demand side interest rate 
channel, while bank-level data are more useful to identify the bank lending channel 
because the response of loan supply to monetary policy shocks should be different 
across banks of different bank characteristics. By using bank-level data, any 
systematic differences in the impact of consolidation in banking on the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism across banks of different types and levels of financial 
strength can be tested properly. There are at least two reasons why it is especially 
relevant to study this issue in Asian and Latin American countries. First, the banking 
sectors in these countries have experienced financial crises and banking crises, after 
which the countries moved to the flexible exchange rate regime which makes 
monetary policy matter. Second, these crises cause dramatic changes in the structure 
of the banking sector in these countries.  
This essay is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. 
Section 3 describes the data and discusses the methodology. Section 4 presents the 
results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
1.2 Literature Review 
This section proceeds as follows. We first discuss the empirical papers 
contributing to the literature, and then review the theoretical foundations of this study. 
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Adams and Amel (2005) use annual panel data in the U.S. for the period from 
1996 to 2002, and find that the impact of the bank-lending channel is weaker as 
markets become more concentrated. They apply the case only on the U.S. banking 
sector, and use one measurement for concentration: Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI). I investigate twenty countries in Latin America and Asia area. Besides HHI, I 
also use other measures for banking concentration for robustness checks: 
concentration ratio CR3 and CR5 (share of total assets held by 3 or 5 largest banks) in 
this study. More importantly, Adam and Amel use aggregate data, while I use bank-
level data (balance sheets and income statement data) instead to study the transmission 
of monetary policy. The responses of banks to the changes in monetary policy are 
expected to be varying according to their individual bank characteristics, such as size, 
liquidity and capitalization. 
Favero, Giavazzi, and Flabbi (1999) use the data from the balance sheets of 
individual banks from France, Germany, Italy and Spain to study the response of bank 
loans to a contractionary monetary policy. Their data covers the single year of 1992, 
because monetary policies were tightened throughout Europe only during that time. 
They find that there is no significant response of bank loans to the monetary policy 
tightening in any of the four European countries they investigated. However, they find 
that there are significant differences both across countries and across banks in the way 
that banks protect the supply of loans from a liquidity squeeze. They recognize the 
importance of the credit channel in Europe but they do not investigate the degree of 
concentration in the banking sector in affecting the transmission of monetary policy. 
Our paper studies on how concentration in the banking system affects the bank lending 
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channel as a monetary policy transmission mechanism for 20 Asian and Latin 
American countries.  
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) use 31 countries data set to analyze the 
differences in the speed of monetary policy transmission through the interest rate 
channel. They report that entry barriers slow the speed of transmission, but the 
differences in market concentration do not have a significant effect on the strength of 
monetary policy transmission.  
From a theoretical perspective, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) assume that loans 
and bonds are imperfect substitutes, and modify the traditional IS-LM model. The 
modified model indicates that the supply of credit and demand shocks independently 
affects aggregate demand, and the channels of the monetary transmission mechanism 
are also different. Bernanke (1993) stresses that the borrowers who do not have good 
alternatives to banks as sources of credit reduce aggregate spending when the central 
bank conduct tight monetary policy, thereby reducing the bank reserves. Bank loans 
decline along with deposits, as in the monetarist transmission process. Blinder and 
Stiglitz (1983) examine the impact of monetary policy on the bank loan market. An 
expansion of reserves enables banks to increase their loans to their customers, and 
leads to an increase in aggregate demand for goods, and possibly supply of goods. 
This channel could explain the impact of monetary policy on both real and nominal 
output at the bank level.  
More explorations about the effect of banking concentration on the monetary 
policy transmission are needed to be done. The main contribution of this essay is to 
extend the analysis of the impact of the increased banking concentration in Asian and 
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Latin American countries in recent years on the bank lending channel as the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism using bank-level data. 
 
1.3 Data Description and Methodology 
1.3.1 Data description 
               This essay uses balance sheet information of individual banks in 10 Asian 
countries and 10 Latin American countries. The former group consists of China, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
the latter group consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The countries are chosen because they are  
significant economies in each region, the banking sector plays an important role in 
each country, and relatively good quality of bank-level data for recent years are 
available. Our data set is panel data of 882 banks during the period from 1996 to 2006 
in the twenty countries. The main data resource for bank-level data is Bankscope data 
base4
                                                            <Table 1.1>  
, and that for macroeconomic data is International Financial Statistics. The 
numbers of banks that our data set covers for each country and each year are shown in 
Table 1.1. 
I also control for the effects of banks whose lending activities are marginal or 
unusually volatile by dropping them based on consistent rules. For example, a bank 
                                                   
4 In order to make sure our sample data set from Bankscope is accurate, we compared the Argentina 
banking concentration degree calculated by three different measures from Bankscope data base with the 
concentration indexes computed by our population data from Argentina banks’ balance sheet 
information during 1996-2005. The Argentina banking concentration indexes show that HHI, CR3, and 
CR5 are consistent and similar in both Bankscope and the population data set from Argentina banks. 
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whose ratio of total loans to total assets is less than 20% is regarded as a marginal 
lending activity bank. A bank whose total assets increase by more than 50% or fall by 
more than 50%, relative to the previous period, are most likely involved in mergers or 
acquisitions. I delete these types of banks from the sample, so the number of banks in 
our sample is reduced from 1048 banks to 882 banks. 
                                 <Table 1.2> ~ <Table 1.4>                                                 
The Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI) is used as the concentration 
measurement, which is defined as the sum of the squared loan market shares. There 
are also two alternative measures of banking concentration: concentration ratios of 
CR3 (the share of total assets held by 3 largest banks) and CR5 (the share of total 
assets held by 5 largest banks). Means, standard deviations, minima and maxima of 
some important variables in real terms for the entire data set, Asian countries data and 
Latin American countries data are given in Tables 1.2 through 1.4. Figure 1.1 shows 
how main variables change over time for each country, which includes monetary 
policy, loans, total assets, HHI, CR3 and CR5. It is assumed that monetary policy 
shifts banks’ marginal costs by affecting the interest rates they must pay at the margin 
for loanable funds. Various interest rates (Treasury bill rate, money market rate or 
discount rate) are taken as the measure for monetary policy. These interest rates have 
been used in many of the previous research on monetary policy. The three banking 
concentration measures, HHI, CR3 and CR5, are shown to consistently co-move in 
almost all countries. 
                                             <Figure 1.1> 
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              For the bank level analysis, specific bank characteristics are required to 
control for financial constraints in order to isolate the effect of consolidation and to 
avoid a possibility that the consolidation measure is only affecting financial 
constraints. This is because the response of banks to a change in monetary policy is 
expected to be different according to their different bank level characteristics. These 
characteristics include bank size, liquidity and capitalization. The variable of bank size 
is defined as the differences between the log of assets for bank i at time t and the 
average of the log of assets for all banks in a country during the same period. Liquidity 
is measured by the ratio of cash and reserves to total assets in each bank. 
Capitalization is measured by the ratio of equity capital to total assets at the individual 
bank level. Most economists believe that the monetary transmission mechanism will 
vary systematically across countries with different size of banks, concentration, the 
health condition of the banking industry, and the availability of financing from capital 
market. Cecchetti (1999) finds that the national asymmetries in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism are due to the differences in financial structure, and these 
differences in financial structure are caused by the diversity in legal structure. 
Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), Kishan and Opiela (2000), Kahyap and Stein (2000) 
measure bank characteristics using liquidity, size, and capitalization. Houston et al. 
(1997) studies the role of internal markets in banking, and find that the loan growth of 
bank subsidiaries is sensitive to the holding companies’ financial position. Ashcraft 
(2001) makes a similar approach which exploits a panel database of US banks, by 
using bank affiliation with multi-bank holding companies as a proxy measure for 
financial constraints. 
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1.3.2 The Methodology 
I use the following equation (1) as the model to analyze the effect of banking 
concentration on the transmission of monetary policy:  
itstst
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                                                                                                                 (1) 
 
Equation (1) relates the percentage change in the loan volume to changes in the 
monetary policy, the market consolidation, the interactions of market consolidation 
and the change of monetary policy, and the relevant control variables. In this equation, 
i refers to individual banks, t is time. α is the constant which represents the bank level 
fixed effect. y is loan growth, the dependent variable. m represents the change in the 
interest rate, and c is banking market consolidation. In this model, I interact a measure 
of consolidation in the banking industry with the monetary policy variable to model 
the effect of consolidation in the banking sector on the bank lending channel of 
monetary policy. The z variables are the bank-level characteristics to control for 
financial constraints, which are size, capitalization, and liquidity. x is the GDP growth 
rate which is adopted to control for changes in loan demand. 
 Market size varies substantially across countries in our sample. Therefore, to 
avoid a given change in the monetary policy rate to have a larger impact on the 
volume of loans in larger markets, I use the percentage change in loans as the 
dependent variable instead of the volume of loans itself. 
 I follow Adams and Amel (2005) and Ashcraft (2006) assuming that monetary 
policy shifts banks’ marginal costs by affecting the interest rates they must pay for 
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loanable funds. Therefore, for the measure of monetary policy (m), the first difference 
of short-term interest rates is used. 
Since most countries in our sample have experienced financial crises and 
banking crises during varying time periods, year dummies are introduced into the 
model to control the year effect which maybe brought by these factors. 
This study uses bank-level data (balance sheet data), instead of macroeconomic 
data, to study the transmission of monetary policy, because it is widely accepted that 
aggregate time series data are not suitable for identifying the supply side credit 
channels of monetary policy transmission from the demand side interest rate channels. 
Bank-level data helps to identify the credit channel by investigating a specific 
empirical implication of the credit view: the response of loan supply to monetary 
policy shocks should be different across banks of different bank characteristics. 
Using bank-level data allows us to control for different degrees of financial 
constraints faced by heterogeneous banks5
As employed as a standard practice in the banking literature, I proxy this 
strength using a liquidity measure (z1) and a capitalization measure (z2). The degree of 
liquidity is computed as the ratio of liquid assets (cash and reserves) to total assets. 
The degree of capitalization is computed as the ratio of equity capital to total assets. 
The assumption is that banks with more liquid assets and better capitalized banks, 
. Here I use three specific bank 
characteristics: size, liquidity and capitalization to proxy for these heterogeneities in 
financial constraints or in the strength of banks’ balance sheets. 
                                                   
5 See Peltzman (1969), Kashyap and Stein (1995 and 2000), Cecchetti (1999), Favero et al (1999), 
Kishan and Opiela (2000) and Ashcraft (2006), among others for a detailed discussion on the need for 
these controls. 
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which tend to pay a lower risk premium for non-insured debt, are better prepared to 
isolate their loans from unexpected shocks to deposits. 
A measure of bank size (z3) is also included, which can capture elements 
unrelated to the strength of their balance sheets. The argument is that bigger banks 
might find it easier to issue market instruments, which would make them better 
prepared to face a negative monetary shock. Following Arena et al (2007) and to 
eliminate possible trends in the measure of size, I use a relative measure, calculated as 
the difference between the logarithm of total assets of a bank in a given period, and the 
average of the logarithm of assets across all banks in that same period: 
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)ln(                              (2) 
where n represents the number of banks in a specific country and year.  
There are some concerns on possible endogeneity associated with the z 
controls. First, bank size may be endogenous to loan growth. Second, it is not clear 
that better capitalized banks are less financially constrained, i.e. a bank may choose to 
raise more equity only because it faces a higher external finance premium at first. 
Third, bank liquidity can also be a biased measure of financial constraints if banks 
optimally choose to have a more liquid asset structure just to compensate for higher 
financing restrictions. To reduce potential bias to the regression coefficients associated 
to these endogeneities, I follow Arena et al (2007) and use the lagged values of these 
bank-level characteristics in equation (1).  
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Having these controls for bank-level characteristics should result in more 
efficient estimates of the coefficients of interest on the monetary policy indicator and 
the interaction term. 
Other explanatory variable x containing the GDP growth rate is included as 
controls for possible changes in the loan demand effects. It is expected that this control 
variable will have a positive coefficient.  
It is expected that an increase in the interest rate reduces the growth of bank 
lending, so that the coefficient of monetary policy δ should be negative. If the banking 
market consolidation would weaken the bank lending channel as the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, the coefficient of the interaction term φ  would be positive. 
Otherwise, the coefficient of the interaction term would be negative. 6
Both the GLS and fixed effect regressions are used to deal with a possible 
simultaneity concern and the bank-specific factors which were not fully accounted for 
in bank-level characteristic variables in the estimation. Akaike criterion is used to 
determine the optimal number of lags for the variables in this model. 
  
 
1.4 Empirical results  
 Several versions of equation (1) are estimated by using GLS and the fixed 
effect estimation on the entire data sample and Asian and Latin American subsamples 
using three different measures of banking market concentration: HHI, CR3 and CR5. 
                                                   
6 When the interaction term has a positive sign, the effect of monetary policy on loans growth with the 
banking market concentration impact could be still negative, if the absolute value of δ is greater than 
φ *c.   
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Table 1.5 shows the estimation result of equation (1) for the entire data sample by 
using both GLS and the fixed effect regression, for HHI as the measure of banking 
market concentration. From Table 1.5, the results of fixed effect estimation shows that 
the coefficients on all independent variables are significant in the 1% confidence level, 
and GLS results are also highly significant for most important independent variables. 
The coefficient of GDP growth rate, which is the loans’ demand control variable, is 
positive as expected, indicating that growing economy raises demand for loans and 
enforces the loans’ growth. The coefficient on the monetary policy variable is negative 
as expected, which means that when central bank contracts monetary policy, by 
raising the interest rate, bank loan will be reduced. The coefficient of the interaction 
term, the change of monetary policy times HHI, is positive and significant, which 
implies that banking sector consolidation weakens the effect of monetary policy on the 
growth rate of bank loans. That proves the hypothesis: The higher the concentration in 
the banking sector, the weaker the bank lending channel as the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. 
                                                     <Table 1.5> 
 The coefficient on HHI is negative and statistically significant when the model 
is estimated by using the fixed effect regression. It may suggest that when banking 
market becomes more concentrated, the growth rate of bank loan would decrease. The 
coefficients on the control variables for the bank characteristics are all statistically 
significant. The responses of banks to monetary policy are different according to the 
different bank characteristics. Kahyap and Stein (1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) 
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find that large size banks are less sensitive than small size banks when central bank 
tightens its monetary policy. 
                                                    <Table 1.6> 
 Table 1.6 shows percentage changes in bank lending as a result of a one 
percentage point change in the stance of monetary policy indicator for the entire data 
set when HHI is used as the measure of banking market consolidation. In Table 1.6, 
the first row gives the effect of one percentage point change of interest rate on 
percentage changes in the growth rate of loans ( HHI*φδ + ), evaluated at the sample 
mean of the banking market concentration. The remaining three rows of Table 1.6 
reports the effect of one percentage point change in the interest rate on percentage 
changes in bank lending, at 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of the HHI for the entire data 
set regression. In all cases, an increase in the interest rate has a negative impact on 
bank lending. As concentration rises, the effect of monetary policy on bank loans 
through the bank lending channel diminishes. 
                                                      <Table 1.7> 
                                                      <Table 1.8> 
 I split the entire data sample into two regions: Latin America and Asia. Table 
1.7 and Table 1.8 report the results for these sets of regressions using GLS and the 
fixed effect regressions. They show the effect of one percentage point change in the 
stance of monetary policy on percentage changes in bank lending for the different 
levels of banking sector concentration (HHI) in Latin American countries and Asian 
countries. The estimation results of Latin American and Asian banks are consistent 
with the results from the whole sample estimation. The results verify that banking 
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market consolidation makes the bank lending channel weaker in both Latin America 
and Asia banking sectors. 
                                             <Table 1.9> ~ <Table 1.14> 
 The estimation results for large size and small size subgroups are reported in 
Tables 1.9 and 1.10. The results for high liquidity and low liquidity banks are reported 
in Tables 1.11 and 1.12. And the results for high capitalization and low capitalization 
subsamples are reported in Tables 1.13 and 1.14. For all these estimation, the HHI is 
used as the measure of banking consolidation. I split the data set into these subsamples 
using their median values: the median of size, liquidity and capitalization. Table 1.9, 
for example, shows that the regression results are highly statistically significant at the 
1% confidence level and the signs of coefficients are as expected for both small and 
large size subgroups using GLS and the fixed effect regressions, which support our 
proposition again. We can see that the effect of one percentage point change in the 
interest rate on  percentage point changes in bank lending is stronger for small size 
banks than large size banks. This is consistent with the results from Kahyap and Stein 
(1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) which show that large banks are less sensitive to 
changes in monetary policy than small banks. I find the similar results from high 
liquidity and low liquidity cases, as well as high capitalization and low capitalization 
subsamples. The effect of monetary policy on bank lending by low liquidity (or low 
capitalization) banks is stronger than by high liquidity (or low capitalization) banks 
through the bank lending channel.  
                                               <Table 1.15> ~ <Table 1.34> 
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 Tables 1.15 through Table 1.34 show the regression results estimated for two 
alternative measures of banking market consolidation: the share of total assets held by 
3 largest banks (CR3) and the share of total assets held by 5 largest banks (CR5) using 
both GLS and the fixed effect regression, as robust tests for our hypothesis. All of 
these cases estimation results are highly statistically significant and consistent with the 
results when the HHI is used as the measure of banking concentration. Therefore, the 
estimation results provide consistent evidence that highly concentrated banking market 
dampens the bank lending channel as the transmission of monetary policy.  
 
1.5 Conclusion   
 This empirical paper uses balance sheet data from Bankscope to study how 
banking market consolidation affects the bank lending channel as the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy in twenty Asian and Latin American countries during 
the period from 1996 to 2006. The estimation results provide consistent evidence that 
an increase in banking sector consolidation makes the bank lending channel as the 
monetary policy transmission mechanisms weaker. The empirical results are robust to 
alternative measures of consolidation and to the sets of countries considered.  
I also find that the effect of monetary policy on the bank lending is stronger for 
banks of small size (low liquidity or low capitalization) than banks of large size (high 
liquidity or high capitalization). 
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 From a policy perspective, our findings call for either a closer overseeing of 
consolidation efforts in the banking industry or for measures that can offset the 
negative effects of further consolidation on the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
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Chapter 2: Banking Competition and the Lending Channel:  Evidence from         
Bank-level Data in Asia and Latin America 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 In this paper, I estimate a measure of competition in the banking sector for a 
total of 20 countries in Latin America and Asia, and investigate how competition in 
the banking industry affects the transmission of monetary policy in recent years. This 
study focus on the impact of banking competition on the bank lending channel, 
according to which banks with different bank characteristics and financial strength 
play a distinctive role in the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks. 
 Using aggregate data, Adams and Amel (2005) find that concentration in the 
banking sector weakens the bank lending channel as the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in the US banking market. According to the structure-conduct-
performance proposition, greater concentration results in less competition. This 
implies that banking competition may strengthen the bank lending channel. However, 
market power (banking competition) does not necessarily have the same effect on 
monetary policy transmission as does market structure (banking concentration). The 
degree of banking concentration is measured as the market share held by the largest 
banks. The degree of banking competition is, meanwhile, often measured as a bank’s 
ability to affect prices in the banking market. A more concentrated bank industry is not 
always expected to be less competitive than a less concentrated one. Therefore, 
competitive banking may or may not strengthen the bank lending channel. 
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In this paper, the empirical evidences show that a higher level of banking 
competition weakens the monetary transmission mechanism. Banking competition 
may affect the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel in 
the following ways. First, if there are informational asymmetries across banks, this can 
make the bank lending channel of monetary policy weaker. The idea is that with a 
strengthening of customer “lock-in” or “hold-up” effects due to banks’ proprietary 
information about their customers and customers’ high switching costs, banks start 
finding it easier to respond to the changes in reserves implied by monetary policy 
without significantly affecting their supply of loans. It reduces the impact of monetary 
policy on bank loans, implying a weaker bank lending channel. There is a large 
incentive for incumbents to compete for a larger market share to maintain 
informational advantages over other banks or newly entering banks to the banking 
market.  
Second, in order to obtain more profit in the intensive competitive banking 
market, these competitive large banks, in particular, may have access to sources of 
funds other than transaction and savings deposits (such as CDs or inter-bank loans). 
This can help large banks prevent a contraction in the supply of loans after a squeezing 
of bank reserves due to a monetary policy tightening as the banking competition 
becomes greater. Therefore, the bank lending channel as a transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy is likely to be made weaker when market competition in the banking 
sector increases. 
Third, the sensitivity of bank loan rates and deposit rates to the changes in 
monetary policy depends on the intensity of banking competition. For example, it is 
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found that changes in monetary policy and money market rates have a stronger impact 
on the deposit rate under a more competitive banking system than in a less competitive 
system. (Freixas and Rochet 1997) When a monetary policy tightening drains bank 
reserve and deposits, the deposit rate increases more in a more competitive banking 
market than otherwise, implying that the deposits decrease less in a highly competitive 
market as well as loan supply. This suggests that more competition in banking 
decreases the impact of monetary policy on loan supply. However, an increase in 
competition may make the monetary policy transmission stronger over time if the 
changes in the interest rate on deposits caused by a shock to reserves are directly 
transmitted to the interest rate on loans. Which of these effects of banking competition 
on the bank lending channel as a monetary policy transmission mechanism dominates 
is not clear from the literature and it is ultimately an empirical question. This is one of 
the main questions that this paper aims to answer. 
  To empirically measure the degree of competition in the banking sector, I 
apply a widely used technique7, developed by Panzar and Rosse (PR, 1987).8
                                                   
7 For example, Bikker and Haaf (2002), Claessens and Laeven (2004), Yildirim and Philippatos (2007),  
Casu and Girardone (2006), etc, use Panzar Rosse statistic to measure the degree of competition in the 
banking sector. 
 This 
technique attempts to measure the competitive behavior of banks without explicitly 
using information on the structure of the market, but by estimating deviation from 
competitive pricing.   
8 The PR model uses bank level data, but Bresnahan and Lau model (another technique to measure the 
degree of banking competition) is applied to aggregate industry data. Therefore, we use PR model to 
estimate the competition in banking market in this study. 
 
23 
 
 
 The Panzar and Rosse model examines the relationship between a change in 
factor input prices and revenue earned by a specific bank. Panzar and Rosse show that, 
under perfect competition, an increase in input prices increases marginal costs and 
marginal revenues but by the same amount as the initial cost increase. Under a 
collusive environment, assuming profit maximization, an increase in input prices will 
increase marginal cost, reduce equilibrium output, and in turn reduce total revenues. A 
PRH-statistic is calculated as the measurement of the elasticity of revenue with respect 
to input prices. H=1 implies perfect competition, H=0 indicates perfect collusion, and 
the measures in-between represent monopolistic competition, so that the magnitude of 
H serves as a measure of competition. Values less than 0 are consistent with perfect 
collusion among the players in the market.  
To my knowledge, there exists no research on the effects of banking 
competition on the sensitivity of bank lending to monetary policy changes in Latin 
American and Asian countries. So far studies have focused mostly on the effect of 
banking concentration on the bank lending channel and only for the United States.  
The banking sectors in Latin American and Asian countries provide a useful 
laboratory to study this issue. In the last decade, the banking industries of several 
Latin American and Asian countries have undergone important changes. The 
consolidation in their banking sectors has increased dramatically through a boom of 
mergers and acquisitions, privatization of state-owned banks, and deregulation efforts. 
They have also experienced significant increases in foreign bank penetration since the 
early 1990s, and investment banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies have all 
begun to compete for businesses of commercial banks (see Yildirim and Philippatos, 
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2005). These developments in the regions have raised concerns about the impact of 
banking competition on the effectiveness of monetary policy.  
This paper uses bank-level balance sheet and income statement data which 
allows us to test one of the main propositions of the bank lending channel: that the 
response of banks to monetary policy shocks should be different depending on their 
individual characteristics, such as size, liquidity, and capitalization. In particular, using 
bank-level data we can better identify the effects of the supply-side bank lending 
channel from those of the demand-side interest rate channel, and to test for any 
systematic differences in the impact of competition in banking on monetary policy 
transmission across banks which have different types of financial strength9
This paper presents consistent evidence that increased competition in the 
banking sector weakens the monetary policy transmission mechanism through the 
bank lending channel in the Asian and Latin American countries. It is also found that 
banking competition in Latin America is higher than in Asia, making the bank lending 
channel weaker there.  
. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides literature 
review. Section 3 describes the data and discusses the research methodology and the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 reports estimation results and discusses their 
implications. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
                                                   
9 Favero, Giavazzi, and Flabbi (1999) study the response of bank loans to monetary policy tightening 
using bank-level balance sheet data for France, Germany, Italy and Spain.  
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This section proceeds as follows. First, review the relevant literature on 
empirical research on the topic; then review the literature which provides theoretical 
foundations to this study. 
Adams and Amel (2005) examine a subject which parallels the present study. 
Using annual panel data in the United States from 1996 to 2002, they find that the 
effect of monetary policy on the bank lending channel is weaker in concentrated 
banking markets. They apply the case only to the United States banking sector, and 
use one measurement for concentration: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). We, on 
the other hand, focus on 20 countries in Latin America and Asia, and investigate the 
relationship between banking competition (PRH statistic as the measure of 
competition) and the strength of monetary policy transmission. Adam and Amel 
(2005) use aggregate data, while we, instead, use microeconomic data (balance sheet 
data), because, according to the individual bank characteristics,  the responses of 
banks to the changes in monetary policy are expected to be different.  
Favero, Giavazzi, and Flabbi (1999) use the balance sheet data of individual 
banks from France, Germany, Italy and Spain to study the response of bank loans to a 
contractionary monetary policy. They study the year 1992, a period when monetary 
policies were tightened throughout Europe. They find that there is no significant 
response of bank loans to the monetary policy tightening in any of the four European 
countries. However, they do find that there are significant differences in the way that 
banks protect the supply of loans from a liquidity squeeze both across countries and 
across banks. They use the balance sheet data of individual banks from the BankScope 
database, but they study a different question from ours: the response of bank loans to a 
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contractionary monetary policy throughout Europe occurred during 1992 and they 
only investigate the case on four European countries. They consider the importance of 
the credit channel in Europe but they do not investigate whether or not the market 
power of the banking sector plays a role in affecting the transmission of monetary 
policy through the bank lending channel.  
From a theoretical perspective, Vanhoose (1983) compares the effects of 
monetary policy in both the perfectly and imperfectly competitive banking market. 
This paper demonstrates that the federal funds rate is an ineffective target for 
monetary policy in a competitive banking sector, although traditional short run effects 
can be caused by adjusting the federal funds rate as the banking market is imperfectly 
competitive. In contrast, the level of currency and unborrowed reserves can be 
conducted as an effective target in either perfectly or imperfectly competitive banking 
market. Vanhoose (1985) finds that if the security rate is the Fed’s policy instrument, 
higher banking competition has no effect on monetary policy. The results are the same 
in terms of contemporaneous and lagged reserve accounting. When the bank reserve is 
the operating target of the central bank, the effect of banking competition on monetary 
policy depends on the institutional structure of either contemporaneous reserve 
requirements or lagged reserve requirements.   
An earlier work by Aftalion and White (1978) demonstrate a monetary system 
in European countries in which the central bank conducts monetary policy by pegging 
the discount rate. They examine the different effects of a monopoly and a competitive 
banking system, as well as the responses of the monetary system to monetary policy 
and exogenous shocks. They find that for any given discount rate, a monopoly banking 
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sector offers a lower loans’ rate than that of a competitive banking system. This occurs 
because a monopoly banking sector can internalize the deposit, while the competitive 
banks cannot externalize the deposit creation. This result should not necessarily lead to 
a preference for monopoly than a competitive banking system. Further, they find that 
the monopoly will set a lower deposit rate than the competitive banks, and the 
monopolist’s spread between the deposit rate and the lending rate will always be larger 
than that of the competitive banking system. Hence, the monopoly banking 
performance is detrimental to the public’s welfare. Dell’Ariccia (2001) develops a 
theoretical model to demonstrate how asymmetric information can affect both the 
banking market structure and competitive behavior, and finds that highly concentrated 
banking markets can be very competitive due to asymmetric information. 
 From the existing literature, it is still not settled on how banking competition 
affects the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. More 
research on this topic is definitely needed. 
 
2.3 Data description and methodology  
2.3.1 Data description 
 I use annual panel data in balance sheets and income statements retrieved from 
the Bankscope database during the period 1996 to 2006.  The data set covers a total of 
882 banks in 10 Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) and 10 Latin American countries 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
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Venezuela). Macroeconomic data on interest rates, GDP for all countries and 
Consumer price indices are obtained from the International Financial Statistics. 
I also control for the effects of banks whose lending activities are marginal and 
those who have been involved in mergers or acquisitions. A bank which has a ratio of 
total loans to total assets of less than 20 percent is considered to be a marginal lending 
activity bank, which is excluded from our data set. Banks whose total assets increase 
or decrease by more than 50 percent from the previous year are also excluded from our 
data set since they have most likely been involved in mergers or acquisitions or 
unusual business situations like liquidation. 
                                       <Table 2.1> ~ <Table 2.3> 
Tables 2.1~2.3 show the summary statistics of the key variables used in this 
paper. Means, standard deviations, minima and maxima in real terms are given for the 
entire data set, Latin American countries and Asian countries during the period from 
1996 to 2006. 
                                               <Table 2.4> 
Table 2.4 reports the available number of observations for each country, to 
measure the Panzar-Rosse H statistic from 1996 to 2006 for all banks in our sample, as 
well as for large banks, medium banks and small banks. The partition in large, 
medium and small size banks has been made according to the banks’ real total assets 
for each country: the largest 10 percent of all banks in each country form the 
subsample of large banks, the smallest 50 percent of all banks in each country 
constitute the small banks subgroup, and the remaining 40 percent of all banks are 
classified in the medium banks sample. Since large banks only include 10 percent of 
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all banks to ensure that only the real large banks are counted in, this sample is 
relatively smaller than the other two subsamples. From Table 2.4, we can see that the 
distribution of bank size based on the real total assets varies across the different 
countries. 
                                                  <Table 2.5>    
                                                               <Table 2.6> 
The Panzar-Rosse H statistics (PRH) are estimated and reported for all banks, 
as well as for three subsamples, large banks, medium banks and small banks for each 
country in 1996, 1997 and 2006 in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6. In general, we can see that 
the banks in the 20 Latin American and Asian countries operate in a monopolistic 
competition environment. For some countries, PRH is high, for example, Chile, 
Thailand and Uruguay. Several researchers have reported that banking competition in 
some developing countries is high, or even higher than some developed countries. 
(e.g. Yildirim and Philippatos (2006), Yuan (2006), and Gelos and Roldos (IMF 
working paper)) Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) find that European Union experienced a 
significant decrease in banking competition, but the banking sector in emerging 
markets has become more competitive since the early 1990s. Second, during the 
process of financial liberalization and international integration, foreign bank 
participation was encouraged by local banking authorities in Latin American 
developing countries following financial crisis, as they tried to minimize the costs of 
recapitalizing domestic financial systems. A higher degree of foreign bank penetration 
may be associated with a higher level of competition, profitability and improved 
efficiency in domestic markets. From Table 2.5-2.6, we also find that large banks are 
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in a more competitive environment relative to small and medium banks, which is 
consistent with the finding in Bikker and Haaf (2002).  
             For the bank level analysis, specific bank characteristics are required to 
control for financial constraints. These characteristics control variables are bank size, 
liquidity and capitalization. Bank size is defined as the difference between the log of 
assets for bank i at time t, and the average of the log of assets for all banks in a country 
during the same period. Liquidity is measured by the ratio of cash and reserves to total 
assets at the individual bank level. Capitalization is measured by the ratio of equity 
capital to total assets at the individual bank level. 
 To explore a possibility of the geographical differences, the entire data set is 
divided into Asian and Latin American subsamples. Therefore, I can examine whether 
or not the impact of competition in the banking sector on the bank lending channel 
varies by different categories. Most countries in our sample have experienced financial 
crises and banking crises during different time periods: the 1997 Asia financial crisis 
started in Thailand with the collapse of the Thai baht after the decision by the Thai 
government to float the baht, cutting its peg to the US dollar. As the crisis spread, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Philippines were most 
affected by the crisis. The 2001-2002 crisis of Argentina also severely hurt its 
neighboring countries including Paraguay, Uruguay, and Peru. Brazil has experienced 
financial crisis during 1998-1999, marked by the sharp devaluation of its currency. 
Crisis dummies are introduced into the model to control the crisis effect. 
 
2.3.2 Methodology 
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This empirical study is conducted in two stages. In the first step, estimate the 
degree of banking competition using the PRH statistic based on the Panzar Rosse 
model; then investigate how banking competition affects the transmission of monetary 
policy through the bank lending channel.   
In this study, I follow the methodology of Bikker and Haaf (2002) to calculate 
the PRH statistic, the measure of banking market competition, which is the sum of the 
elasticities of the prices with respect to marginal costs, calculated by the following 
equation (1):  
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          (1) 
where P is the ratio of financial income to total assets, W1 is the ratio of financial 
expenses to total assets, W2 is the ratio of administrative expenses to total assets, and 
W3 represents the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. The C variables are 
exogenous control variables at the bank level: C1 is the ratio of equity to total assets, 
C2 is the ratio of net loans to total assets, C3 is the total assets, C4 is the ratio of other 
income to total assets, and ε is a stochastic error term. In equation (1), the Panzar and 
Rosse H statistic reads as β1+β2+ β3, which is the sum of the elasticities of the banking 
marginal price with respect to the marginal cost. When the level of banking market 
competition is high, the value of the PRH statistic would also be high, and vise versa. 
Under perfect competition, PRH is equal to 1.0. If PRH is zero or below zero, market 
structure is considered to be a monopoly or close to monopoly. Between 0 and 1, the 
banking market is in a monopolistic competition. 
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Market structure usually changes gradually over time. If ignore market 
dynamics, we may arrive at imprecise parameter estimations and biased PRH 
statistics, then obtain wrong inferences about the degree of competition in the banking 
industry. Therefore, the marginal cost terms are multiplied by a continuous time curve 
model factor, given by exp(ε*time). Equation (1) becomes: 
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Note that ε=0 indicates that H is constant over time. If ε is not equal to zero, 
the PRH statistic is equal to (β1+β2+ β3)*exp(ε*time), then, in this case, PRH depends 
on time.  
The next question is: How does banking competition affect the transmission of 
monetary policy through the bank lending channel?  Following standard practices in 
this literature, in the empirical model we assume that the real effects of monetary 
policy are derived from its effects on banks’ marginal cost of loanable funds. Thus, I 
follow Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and measure the stance of monetary policy 
through changes in the interest rate, so that a monetary tightening (easing) is reflected 
in an increase (decrease) in interest rates. For the sample of Asian and Latin American 
countries, the Treasury bill rate is used. When the Treasury bill rate is not available I 
use the money market rate or the discount rate. These interest rates have been used in 
much of the previous research on monetary policy in global economies.  
 The model is: 
33 
 
 
itstst
kcm
s s
kc
s stsst
km
s stititist
kx
s siti
umccmzzzxy ++++++++= −−== −−=−−−−= ∑∑∑∑ *0001,331,221,110, φθδρρρβα
                                  (3) 
Equation (3) relates the percentage change in the loan volume to the change in 
monetary policy, a measure of market competition, the interactions of market 
competition, and the control variables. In this equation, i refers to individual banks, t is 
time, and s is lag. α is the constant which represents the bank level fixed effect. y is 
loan growth, the dependent variable. m represents the change in the interest rate, and c 
is banking market competition: competition is represented by Panzar Rosse H statistic. 
I interact a measure of competition in the banking industry with the monetary policy 
variable to model the effect of banking competition on the bank lending channel of 
monetary policy. The z variables are the bank-level characteristics to control for 
financial constraints, size, capitalization, and liquidity. x is the GDP growth rate—
control for the changes in loan demand. 
The percentage change in the loan volume is taken as the dependent variable 
because market size varies substantially across markets, such that otherwise the effect 
of a given change in interest rates would be increasing in market size. 
To study the transmission of monetary policy, I use the bank-level balance 
sheet and income statement data. It is widely accepted that aggregate time series data 
are not suitable for identifying credit channels of monetary policy transmission from 
interest rate channels. Bank-level data helps to identify the credit channel by 
investigating a specific empirical implication of the credit view: the response of loan 
supply to monetary policy shocks should be different across banks of different bank 
characteristics. 
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Using bank-level data allows us to control for different degrees of financial 
constraints faced by heterogeneous banks10
As employed as a standard practice in the banking literature, I proxy this 
strength using a liquidity measure (z1) and a capitalization measure (z2). The degree of 
liquidity is computed as the ratio of liquid assets (cash and reserves) to total assets. 
The degree of capitalization is computed as the ratio of equity capital to total assets. 
The assumption is that banks with more liquid assets and better capitalized banks, 
which tend to pay a lower risk premium for non-insured debt, are better prepared to 
isolate their loans from unexpected shocks to deposits. 
. Here I use three specific bank 
characteristics: size, liquidity and capitalization to proxy for these heterogeneities in 
financial constraints or in the strength of banks’ balance sheets. 
A measure of bank size (z3) is also included, which can capture elements 
unrelated to the strength of their balance sheets. The argument is that bigger banks 
might find it easier to issue market instruments, which would make them better 
prepared to face a negative monetary shock. Following Arena et al (2007) and to 
eliminate possible trends in the measure of size, I use a relative measure, calculated as 
the difference between the logarithm of total assets of a bank in a given period, and the 
average of the logarithm of assets across all banks in that same period: 
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where n represents the number of banks in a specific country and year.  
                                                   
10 See Peltzman (1969), Kashyap and Stein (1995 and 2000), Cecchetti (1999), Favero et al (1999), 
Kishan and Opiela (2000) and Ashcraft (2006), among others for a detailed discussion on the need for 
these controls. 
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There are some concerns on possible endogeneity associated with the z 
controls. First, bank size may be endogenous to loan growth. Second, it is not clear 
that better capitalized banks are less financially constrained, i.e. a bank may choose to 
raise more equity only because it faces a higher external finance premium at first. 
Third, bank liquidity can also be a biased measure of financial constraints if banks 
optimally choose to have a more liquid asset structure just to compensate for higher 
financing restrictions. To reduce potential bias to the regression coefficients associated 
to these endogeneities, I follow Arena et al (2007) and use the lagged values of these 
bank-level characteristics in equation (3).  
Having these controls for bank-level characteristics should result in more 
efficient estimates of the coefficients of interest on the monetary policy indicator and 
the interaction term. 
Another explanatory variable of GDP growth rate is included as controls for 
possible changes in loan demand effects, and to isolate the effects of monetary policy 
on the supply-side of the market for loans. It is expected that this control variable will 
have a positive coefficient.  
It is expected that an increase in the interest rate reduces the growth of bank 
lending, so the coefficient of monetary policy δ should be negative. There are two 
scenarios about how banking competition affects the bank lending channel. First, since 
according to the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, market power is directly 
related to concentration (i.e. banking sectors are less competitive when the degree of 
concentration is higher). We expect, from Adams and Amel (2005), that the bank 
lending channel would be stronger when the banking sector is more competitive. 
36 
 
 
Therefore, the coefficient on the interaction term φ  would be negative. Contrarily, in 
the second scenario, banking industry concentration may not necessarily be negatively 
related to competition, because asymmetric information may cause higher competition 
to lead a weaker bank lending channel.11
φ
 This would imply a positive sign for the 
coefficient on the interaction term  in this scenario. Therefore, the sign of the 
coefficient on the interaction term of monetary policy with banking competition is 
indeterminate and it remains as an empirical question. 
I use both GLS and fixed-effects regression for the estimation. The bootstrap 
estimation is conducted as the robustness test12
                                     
. The Akaike criterion is used to 
determine the optimal number of lags for the variables in the model. 
2.4 Empirical results 
 I not only apply equations (1) and (2) to calculate the PRH statistic for each 
country over the time span of 1996-2006 in Table 2.5-2.6, but also compute the PRH 
for each country each year using equation (1), which may indicate the banking market 
structure gradually shifts over the years. Most of the coefficients on lnW2 
(administrative expenses) and lnW3 (personnel expenses) are shown not to be 
                                                   
11 Bikker and Haaf (2002) find that PRH statistics, the measure of banking competition, are different for 
various bank size samples, small banks, medium banks, large banks and all banks for various years. The 
results show that the competition among large banks could be very high. In general, larger banks have 
lower information asymmetries (lower customer lock-in and hold-up effects) than their smaller 
competitors. As these information asymmetries are relaxed (these customer lock-in or hold-up effects 
become weaker), market power in the banking industry shrinks. 
12 According to Wooldridge (2001 chap.6), PRH is generated regressor in the second step, thus, the 
standard error in the estimation could be biased. As robustness test, referring to Wooldridge (2002 
chap.6) I apply the most common resampling method bootstrap to obtain valid standard errors by 
computing the estimate from different random samples. The estimation results by bootstrap 
methodology are presented in the Table 2.19~2.30. 
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significantly different from zero in the first step, while the coefficients on lnW1 
(interest expenses) are significant and taken as the elasticity of marginal price with 
respect to the marginal cost for the banking market structure. In the second step, I 
apply the PRH statistics for each country each year13
                                                                <Table 2.7> 
 to the model (3) to analyze how 
the banking competition affects the bank lending channel in the 15 Latin American 
and Asian countries. 
 Table 2.7 reports the estimation results for the whole data set. The dependent 
variable is the percentage change of loans in Table 2.7. We can see that the regression 
results from GLS and the fixed-effects regression are consistent. The coefficient on the 
GDP growth rate is positive as expected, indicating that a growing economy raises 
loan demand and enforces the growth of loans. The coefficients on three bank 
characteristic control variables (in lag term) of size, liquidity, and capitalization, are 
all statistically significant. The responses of banks to a change in monetary policy vary 
according to different bank characteristics. The coefficient on monetary policy 
changes is negative as expected, implying that when the central bank tightens 
monetary policy (the interest rate rises), the loan growth rate will drop. However, the 
coefficient on the interaction term c*m is positive and statistically significant, which 
suggests that banking market competition weakens the transmission of monetary 
policy through the bank lending channel. 
                                                                 <Table 2.8> 
                                                   
13 I take 20% significant level as the criterion to get the PRH values for each country each year. Bolivia, 
Mexico, China, Hong Kong, Korea are deleted in the second step due to most PRH insignificance in 
these five countries. For the remaining countries, the insignificant PRH values are dropped from our 
data sample. 
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 Table 2.8 shows percentage changes in bank lending as a result of one 
percentage point changes in the stance of monetary policy for the entire data set.  In 
Table 2.8, the first row gives the effect of one percentage point change in the stance of 
interest rate on percentage changes in loans  ( PRH*φδ + ), evaluated at the sample 
mean of banking market competition. The remaining four rows of Table 2.8 shows the 
effect of one percentage point change in the stance of interest rate on percentage 
changes in bank lending, at the 10%, 25% and 50% deciles level of the PRH for the 
whole data set regression. In all cases, an increase in interest rate is shown to have a 
negative impact on bank lending. As the degree of competition rises, the effect of 
monetary policy on the bank lending channel diminishes. 
 The whole data sample is split into the subsamples of Latin American and 
Asian countries. These two subsamples regression results using the GLS and the fixed-
effects estimations are reported in Table 2.9 and Table 2.11. Most coefficients are 
highly significant in both cases and the results are consistent with the estimation 
results of the whole sample data. From Table 2.9 and Table 2.11, we can infer that 
banking competition makes the bank lending channel weaker in the Latin American 
and Asian countries.   
                              <Table 2.9> ~ <Table 2.12>                                
Table 2.10 and Table 2.12 report percentage changes in bank lending as a 
result of one percentage point change in the stance of monetary policy indicator for the 
Latin American and Asian cases, respectively. We can find that banking market 
competition is higher in Latin America than in Asia, and the transmission of monetary 
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policy through the bank lending channel is stronger in the Asian countries than in the 
Latin American countries.  
                             <Table 2.13> ~ <Table 2.18> 
 To investigate whether or not the relationship between banking competition 
and the bank lending channel changes for the banks with different bank characteristics, 
I  split the data into 2 subsamples by each category of bank characteristics, namely the 
subsamples of the banks with large size, small size, high liquidity, low liquidity, high 
capitalization and low capitalization. The data is split by each category of the bank 
characteristics using their median level, that is, the medians of size, liquidity and 
capitalization. All of the subsamples regression results reported in Table 2.13 ~2.18 
are shown to have highly statistically significant coefficients except the high liquidity 
and low capitalization bank group. Overall, the monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms are shown to be affected by different characteristics and financial strength 
of individual banks, which is an important property of the bank lending channel. They 
all show that the higher competition in the banking sector the lower monetary policy 
transmission through the bank lending channel.We can see that the effect of one 
percentage point change in the stance of interest rate on percentage changes in bank 
lending for small size banks (low liquidity banks) is stronger than that for large size 
banks (high liquidity banks)14
                                                   
14 Overall, the estimation results by bootstrap in Appendix are consistent with those presented before, 
except that the Latin American case is not significant.  Table 2.26 and Table 2.28 show that the effect 
of one percentage point change in the stance of interest rate on  percentage changes in bank lending for 
small size banks (low liquidity banks) is stronger than that for large size banks (high liquidity banks).   
. It is hard to compare the results in high and low 
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capitalization banks due to the statistically insignificant coefficients of the low 
capitalization subsample variables. 
                                        <Table 2.19> ~ <Table 2.30> 
 From the empirical evidences above, we can conclude that competition in the 
banking market makes the monetary policy transmission through the bank lending 
channel weaker. 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 This paper uses bank-level balance sheet and income statement data to assess 
how banking market competition affects the transmission of monetary policy through 
the bank lending channel in Latin American and Asian countries during the period 
from 1996 to 2006. A two-step estimation procedure is used: first, to estimate the 
Panzar and Rosse H statistics to measure the degree of competition in banking for 
each country and each year, second, to estimate the loan growth equation where the 
estimated Panzar and Rosse H statistics are used as one of the explanatory variables. 
This study finds consistent evidence that banking market competition is inversely 
related to the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission through the bank lending 
channel. 
 It is found that banking competition in Latin America is higher than that in 
Asia and the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel in 
Latin America is weaker than in Asian countries. Evidence from this study also shows 
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that the effect of monetary policy on the bank lending in small size (low liquidity) 
banks is stronger than that in large size (high liquidity) banks. 
 In order to maintain stability in the banking sector and conduct monetary 
policy effectively, policymakers may need to take into account the buffering effect of 
banking competition on the monetary policy transmission mechanism. One of policy 
options is to use bank regulations and surveillance to manage the level of competition 
in the banking sector. This policy option would enforce banks to better screen their 
customers, lower the risk, stabilize the banking sector and make the transmission of 
monetary policy more effective.   
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Chapter 3: Banking Concentration and Competition: Evidence from Asia and 
Latin America 
 
3.1 Introduction 
When applying the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, which is a 
dominant paradigm in the industrial organization literature, banking concentration is 
expected to bring market power to large banks, resulting in less competition in the 
banking sector. Banking concentration can bring detrimental effects to borrowers, who 
might be charged with higher interest rates. To the contrary, efficiency structure (ES) 
hypothesis posits that banking concentration leads to more competition.  The ES 
proposition claims that banking competition enables the banks to gain efficiency in 
terms of a reduction in the cost of the merged banks. These banks may tend to reduce 
their prices. If lower costs occur in the merged banks, then they become more 
aggressive and reduce prices in order to enlarge their market share. Therefore, banking 
concentration should be associated with a decrease in loan rates, which may not cause 
market power exploitation to increase the banks’ profits. The above theories make 
contradictory predictions about the relationship between banking concentration and 
competition. 
This paper examines the relationship between banking concentration and 
competition by using the aggregate data from 14 Asian and Latin American 
economies15
                                                   
15 The countries included in this study are 7 Asian countries: India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand; and 7 Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
 during the period from 1996 to 2006.  
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There are some literatures which investigate how banking concentration and 
competition are related to each other, but the answer to this question remains 
controversial yet. Some literatures find that banking concentration impairs banking 
competition. For example, Berger and Hannan (1989) find consistent empirical results 
with the implications of the SCP hypothesis. Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) and 
Bikker and Haaf (2002) conclude that the increase in the degree of banking 
concentration is negatively related to competition in the European banking sector.  
 However, some studies find that banking concentration is distinct from 
banking competition. Demirgiic-Kunt et al. (2004) state that using national bank 
concentration measures to proxy for the competitive environment in the banking 
industry may be inappropriate. Jansen and Haan (2003) find there is no evidence 
showing that banking concentration indicators are linked to profitability, and conclude 
that banking concentration and competition are not related. Casu and Girardone 
(working paper) suggest that the degree of banking concentration is not necessarily 
related to the degree of market power in banking sector. Beck et al. (2005, 2006) state 
that increased banking concentration and greater contestability are inversely related to 
the probability of systemic banking crises, and imply that banking concentration 
measures different characteristics besides banking market power. Schaeck et al. (2006) 
distinguish between banking concentration and competition, and find no significant 
relationship between banking concentration and the fragility of the banking system. 
On the contrary, they show empirical evidence that banking competition is 
significantly positively related to the banking system stability. Therefore, they 
conclude that banking concentration and competition are two concepts unrelated to 
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each other, because the two concepts describe different characteristics of the banking 
sector. Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2007) further suggest that it is not at all clear whether 
banking concentration and competition should go in opposite directions. Berger et al. 
(2004, p445) explicitly present that it is inappropriate to rely only on concentration to 
assess the degree of competition in the banking system and state that “More research 
is clearly needed on the topic of bank concentration and competition.” Clasessens and 
Laeven (2004) even report a significantly positive association between banking 
concentration and banking competition in a 50 country large sample.  
It is important to distinguish between banking concentration and competition 
first. Note that market power is not the same concept as market structure. 
Concentration refers to the market share held by the largest banks. Competition refers 
to a bank’s ability to affect prices in the banking market. Thus, intensive competition 
can occur in a very concentrated market, and collusion can occur even in a market 
with many banks.  
 Concentration in banking system may enlarge the market share of consolidated 
banks thereby enhances their market power. The banks having greater market power 
charge a higher markup after the consolidation than before the consolidation.  This 
effect leads to upward pressure on prices. Then the banking concentration should be 
associated with increasing loan rates and decreasing deposit rates as well as decreasing 
supply, as banks try to exploit market power to increase their profits. Therefore, 
banking concentration may lead to market power, and impair the competitiveness in 
the banking system. 
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 However, besides banking concentration, there are many other factors driving 
banking competition, for instance, foreign bank penetration, information technology, 
and asymmetric information etc. Although banking concentration could impair 
competition, highly concentrated banks are not necessarily less competitive,16
 First, foreign bank penetration can affect the competitive conditions of banking 
systems in different ways in host countries. Many developing countries experienced a 
significant increase in foreign bank participation during the late 1990s. Soledad, Peria 
and Mody (2004) find that foreign banks are able to charge lower spreads than 
domestic banks. The spreads measure the cost of financial intermediation (Saunders 
and Schumacher 2000). Foreign banks are often supported and guaranteed by their 
parent banks, thus they have lower funding costs and can gain market share at a lower 
cost. If foreign banks compete directly with domestic banks, the spreads would be 
lowered, and force domestic banks to reduce their spreads. These would cause foreign 
banks and domestic banks compete against each other in the banking markets. Clarke 
et al. (2000) investigate the impact of foreign bank entry on the Argentina banking 
market from 1995 to 1997, and find that foreign bank penetration did exert 
competitive pressure on domestic banks by their lower profit and interest margin 
during that time period. Similarly, Classens et al. (2001) find that increased foreign 
bank participation causes lower bank margins, thus it may improve the efficiency of 
the banking systems. However, some literatures find the opposite evidence about the 
effect of foreign bank penetration on banking competition. Yeyati and Micco (2003) 
 because 
other factors may still affect competitiveness in the banking sector. 
                                                   
16 Canada banking market is highly concentrated because there are only fewer than 10 major banks, but all banks intensively 
compete against each other in this country. 
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find that foreign bank participation causes less competitiveness in the banking sector. 
Their interpretation is: domestic banks are imperfect substitutes of foreign branches, 
because their products are different. The degree of product differentiation becomes 
higher. They also find that foreign banks in Latin American markets are more risky 
than domestic banks because of higher leverage ratios and more volatile returns. Thus, 
foreign penetration could reduce competition. Which one of the effects dominates is 
not clear, so it is one of the questions this paper aims to answer.  
 Second, asymmetric information may influence the competition in banking 
market. Banks collect proprietary information about their customers based on their 
established lending relationships. This information benefits the bank then it has greater 
advantage over other banks. Therefore, the larger the market share a bank attains, the 
greater it benefits. This creates a large incentive for banks to compete strongly for 
market share, which could lower the lending rates even there are small number of 
banks.  
 Third, the forces of technological, regulatory change and other financial 
institutions bring new sources of competition to local banking markets, which may 
also lead to a reduction in margins. For example, using ATMs widely which reduces 
the geographical barriers and eliminating branch restrictions can increase banking 
competition. Episodes of financial crises have forced the national banking authorities 
to deregulate and restructure domestic banking industries. The boom of mergers and 
acquisitions in the banking sector and government efforts for large scale privatization 
of state-owned banks dramatically changed competitive conditions in banking. Also, 
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Investment banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies have all began to compete 
for the business of commercial banks: making loans and collecting deposits. 
 Because the relationship between banking concentration and competition is so 
complicated, further study on how banking concentration and competition are 
associated with each other is needed. In this paper, the Herfindahl Hirschman index 
(HHI), concentration ratio CR3 (share of assets held by the 3 largest banks) and CR5 
(share of assets held by the 5 largest banks) as measures of concentration, and Panzar 
Rosse H statistic as measure of competition, are used to test the relationship between 
the concentration and competition in banking sector.  
This study finds that banking concentration is negatively related with banking 
competition for the Asian and Latin American countries. Our findings are consistent 
with the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm. There is little evidence 
show that banking competition is associated with foreign bank participation for the 
Asian and Latin American countries.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
discusses the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
3.2 Data Description 
 Annual balance sheet and income statement data for the banks in this study are 
obtained from the BankScope database. The data sample covers 686 banks from 14 
Asian and Latin American countries during the period from 1996 to 2006. I use 
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consumer price indices obtained from the International Financial Statistics to convert 
all series into real values. Macroeconomic data on GDP per capita, inflation rate for all 
countries are from the World Development Indicators (WDI). The numbers of banks 
for each country each year are given in Table 3.1.17
                                                            <Table 3.1> 
  
I use the Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI), which is defined as the sum of the 
squared loans market shares, as the concentration measurement. There are also two 
alternative banking concentration measures: concentration ratio CR3 (share of total 
assets held by 3 largest banks) and CR5 (share of total assets held by 5 largest banks). 
The three banking concentration measures, HHI, CR3 and CR5 are shown to 
consistently co-move in all the countries in our sample. 
 I apply the widely used technique to empirically measure the degree of 
competition in the banking sector which is developed by Panzar and Rosse (PR)18
                                                   
17 Chile is not included in the data set, because this country is a singular case in the Latin American 
region. Chile experienced major structural reforms throughout the 1980s, and in the 1990s its banking 
system operated in a healthy macroeconomic and institutional environment, which allowed Chile to be 
isolated from the major regional financial distress in recent years. Chile’s banking system has 
experienced a gradual but steady process of consolidation. At the same time the banking competition 
became also more intensive in recent years. However, in Chile, the increase in foreign penetration 
appears to have had little effect on banking competition. 
. 
This technique attempts to measure the competitive behavior of banks without 
explicitly using information on the structure of the market and it is done by estimating 
deviation from the competitive pricing.  Means, standard deviations, minima and 
maxima of some important variables in real terms for the entire data set, Asian and 
Latin American subsamples are shown in Table 3.2-Table 3.4.  
 
18 The PR model uses bank level data, but Bresnahan and Lau model (another technique to measure the 
degree of banking competition) is applied to aggregate industry data. Therefore, we use PR model to 
estimate the competition in banking market in this study. 
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                                    <Table 3.2> ~ <Table 3.4> 
Opening up of the financial markets for foreign participation is one factor that 
could possibly affect the competition in banking market. The foreign bank penetration 
is proxied by the percentage of the banking system’s assets held by banks with 50% or 
more foreign ownership. A bank is defined as a foreign bank if more than 50 percent 
of its capital is owned by foreign individuals, foreign firms (including banks), or 
international organizations. The Bankscope records the ownership of banks for recent 
years, and SDC Platinum records mergers and acquisitions information. The 
ownership of the banks can be identified through these two data sources and bank’s 
profile of the historical evolution from its website. 19
I follow Claessens and Laeven (2004) to use selected macro variables, the 
logarithm of GDP per capita and inflation rate, to control the countries’ general 
economic development and macro economic stability which can affect the banking 
sector’s performance.  
 
 According to geographical difference, the entire data set is divided into Asian 
and Latin American subsamples. Therefore, I can test the hypothesis banking 
concentration is inversely related to banking competition by different categories. 
 
3. 3 Methodology 
This section proceeds in two stages. First step is to introduce the Panzar Rosse 
model, and show how to get the competition measure: PRH statistic. The main model 
                                                   
19 Identification of foreign banks refers to Luca, Jeon, and Wu (2009) working paper. Thanks to the 
authors generously provided the foreign bank ownership data to this study. 
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that investigates how the banking concentration affects competition will be described 
in the second part of this section.   
In this study, I follow the Bikker and Haaf (2002) methodology to calculate the 
PRH statistic, the measure of banking market competition, which is the sum of the 
elasticities of the prices with respect to marginal costs, calculated by the following 
equation (1):  
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where P is the ratio of financial income to total assets, W1 is the ratio of financial 
expenses to total funds, W2 is the ratio of administrative expenses to total assets, and 
W3 represents the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. The C variables are 
exogenous control variables at the bank level: C1 is the ratio of equity to total assets, 
C2 is the ratio of net loans to total assets, C3 is the total assets, C4 is the ratio of other 
income to total assets, and ε is a stochastic error term. In equation (1), the Panzar and 
Rosse H statistic reads as β1+β2+ β3, which is the sum of elasticities of the banking 
marginal price with respect to the marginal cost.  
 When banking market competition is high, the PRH statistic would be high, 
vise verse. Under perfect competition, PRH is equal to 1, and if PRH is zero or below 
zero, the market structure is monopoly. Between 0 and 1, the banking market is 
monopoly competition. The values of PRH are computed for each country each year 
by equation (1), which may indicate the banking market structure gradually shifts over 
years.  
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      The GLS estimation and the fixed effect (fixed country effect and time effect) 
estimation are used to explore the question that how banking concentration affects 
banking competition at the second step. 
 First, I start with the simplest model: 
          titit conbcom εγ ++= −110                  (2) 
Equation (2) relates the competitiveness of the banking system to the banking market 
consolidation. In this equation, com is banking competition and con is banking 
concentration. 0b  refers to the constant and t is time. εt  is the error term. 
One year lagged term of concentration is added which may reduce the potential 
endogeneity and bias problems, because higher competition may also lead to a 
reduction in margins, which may induce a consolidation process. Consolidated banks 
could survive and operate at a more efficient scale in the competitive environment, 
which allow banks to achieve higher profits.  
Since most countries in the sample have experienced financial crises and 
banking crises during different time periods, year dummies are introduced into the 
model to control the year effect. The country fixed effect is also controlled in this 
model. 
 Then, I incorporate macroeconomic control variables into the model, GDP per 
capita and the inflation rate, because these can be expected to affect the performance 
of the banking system. 
                             titititit gconbcom εγγγ ++++= − inf32110                             (3) 
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In equation (3), g represents the logarithm of GDP per capita, which is used to control 
for the countries’ general economic development. inf represents the inflation rate to 
control for macroeconomic stability. 
 In the following equation (4), the bank control variables are included in the 
model: bank size, liquidity, capitalization and foreign bank ownership, to control for 
bank characteristics for each country. 
                  titititititititit fzzzgconbcom εγγγγγγγ ++++++++= − 736251432110 inf                                   
           (4) 
The z variables control for financial constraints for each country year, which are bank 
size, capitalization, and liquidity20
According to the SCP hypothesis, an increase in the banking consolidation can 
reduce the competitiveness level of the banking system, so that the coefficient of 
banking concentration 
. f is the level of foreign bank penetration which is 
measured using the percentage of the banking system’s assets held by banks with 50% 
or more foreign ownership. 
1γ  should be negative. If banking concentration strengthens 
competition, 1γ  would be positive.  
 
3.4 Empirical results 
                                                   
20 For each bank, liquidity is defined as the ratio of cash plus reserves to total assets; capitalization is 
defined as the ratio of equity to total assets; size is computed as the difference between the log of assets 
of a bank in a given period, and the average of the log of assets for all banks in a country during the 
same period. The aggregate measure in this paper is calculated as the weighted average across banks, 
with the weights given by each bank’s market share in total assets. 
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 I calculate PRH using equation (1) for each country each year and apply the 
PRH statistics to the model (2) (3) (4) to analyze how the banking competition is 
related to the banking consolidation in the 14 Latin American and Asian countries21
                                                               <Table 3.5> 
. 
Most of the coefficients on lnW2 (administrative expenses) and lnW3 (personnel 
expenses) are shown not to be significantly different from zero in the first step, while 
the coefficients on lnW1 (interest expenses) are significant and taken as the elasticity 
of marginal price with respect to the marginal cost for the banking market structure.  
            Table 3.5 reports the empirical results of the equations (2), (3) and (4) for the 
entire data sample by using both GLS and the fixed effect estimations, for the HHI as 
the measure of banking concentration. The parameters of banking concentration (HHI) 
in table 3.5 are negative and significant for both GLS and the fixed effect estimations, 
which means that banking concentration impairs banking competition. This result is 
consistent with the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm and proves 
the hypothesis that more concentrated banking system causes lower level banking 
competition. The foreign bank ownership variable is negatively related to banking 
competition for the whole data sample by the GLS estimation, which shows that 
foreign bank penetration reduces the competitiveness level in the domestic banking 
market, and this result is consistent with Yeyati and Micco (2003) findings. However, 
for other cases (from table 3.6 to table 3.10), I can not find any evidence that foreign 
bank penetration is significantly related with banking competition. When use CR3 or 
                                                   
21 I take 20% significant level as the criterion to get the PRH values for each country each year. Bolivia, 
Mexico, China, Hong Kong, Korea are deleted in the second step due to most PRH insignificance in 
these five countries. For the remaining countries, the insignificant PRH values are dropped from our 
data sample.  
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CR5 as the measures of banking concentration for the whole data sample, I get the 
similar results in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 as before. 
                                             <Table 3.6> ~ <Table 3.10> 
   Table 3.8 reports both GLS and the fixed effect estimations of equation (4) 
for Asian countries and Latin American countries respectively, the HHI as the measure 
of banking market concentration. I get consistent results which show that banking 
concentration weakens the competitiveness of the banking system in both Asian and 
Latin American countries. The foreign bank ownership variable is not related to the 
competitiveness level in the domestic banking market of Asian and Latin American 
countries.  
When use CR3 or CR5 as the measures of banking concentration to estimate 
the equation (4) for both Asian countries and Latin American countries, I get the 
similar results in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10. In general, the regression results provide 
evidence that banking concentration impairs banking competition, and foreign bank 
penetration does not affect the competitiveness of the banking market in Asian and 
Latin American countries. There are some possible reasons for little evidence showing 
that foreign bank participation is associated with banking competition in this study.  
First, this maybe because the two effects about foreign bank penetration I mentioned 
in the first section cancel out. Second, if there are informational asymmetries across 
banks, this can reduce the impact of foreign bank penetration on banking competition. 
The idea is that with a strengthening of customer “lock-in” or “hold-up” effects due to 
banks’ proprietary information about their customers and customers’ high switching 
costs, customers start finding it not easy to switch from national banks to foreign 
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banks. It implies that foreign bank penetration may not significantly affect the 
competitiveness level in the banking sector. Another reason may be due to the data 
quality issue, and the data for some banks of Latin American and Asian countries are 
not reported in the data source. 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
                In this paper, using aggregate panel data for 14 Asian and Latin American 
banking sectors, I explore the impact of banking concentration on the competitiveness 
of the banking system during the period from 1996 to 2006. The results show that 
banking concentration impairs the competitiveness of the banking system, for both 
Asian and Latin American countries, which is consistent with the traditional Structure-
Conduct-Performance hypothesis.   
              This study finds little evidence that foreign bank penetration is a significant 
variable to affect the competitiveness level in the Asian and Latin American banking 
sectors. 
               I will explore the following questions in the future research. First, concerns 
on a possibility of endogeneity or a reverse causality needs to be addressed more 
carefully. Banking competition may induce consolidation in the banking sector, 
because banks would become more consolidated to survive and operate at a more 
efficient scale in the competitive environment, which allow banks to achieve higher 
profits. Second, besides banking concentration, there could be additional factors 
driving banking competition. My future extension includes investigating what they are 
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and how they work in better understanding of the relationship between concentration 
and competition in the banking sector at a global scale.   
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                                              Appendix of Tables 
Table 1. 1  The Number of banks in the data set 
country year bank 
no. 
country year bank 
no. 
ARGENTINA 1996 80 KOREA 1996 29 
ARGENTINA 1997 67 KOREA 1997 26 
ARGENTINA 1998 67 KOREA 1998 17 
ARGENTINA 1999 64 KOREA 1999 18 
ARGENTINA 2000 63 KOREA 2000 16 
ARGENTINA 2001 58 KOREA 2001 15 
ARGENTINA 2002 45 KOREA 2002 15 
ARGENTINA 2003 40 KOREA 2003 17 
ARGENTINA 2004 42 KOREA 2004 17 
ARGENTINA 2005 47 KOREA 2005 19 
ARGENTINA 2006 43 KOREA 2006 16 
BOLIVIA 1996 14 MALAYSIA 1996 34 
BOLIVIA 1997 12 MALAYSIA 1997 29 
BOLIVIA 1998 8 MALAYSIA 1998 31 
BOLIVIA 1999 9 MALAYSIA 1999 28 
BOLIVIA 2000 10 MALAYSIA 2000 20 
BOLIVIA 2001 10 MALAYSIA 2001 21 
BOLIVIA 2002 9 MALAYSIA 2002 22 
BOLIVIA 2003 9 MALAYSIA 2003 23 
BOLIVIA 2004 9 MALAYSIA 2004 21 
BOLIVIA 2005 8 MALAYSIA 2005 23 
BOLIVIA 2006 6 MALAYSIA 2006 21 
BRAZIL 1996 87 MEXICO 1996 27 
BRAZIL 1997 74 MEXICO 1997 23 
BRAZIL 1998 73 MEXICO 1998 25 
BRAZIL 1999 63 MEXICO 1999 28 
BRAZIL 2000 68 MEXICO 2000 26 
BRAZIL 2001 73 MEXICO 2001 24 
BRAZIL 2002 71 MEXICO 2002 21 
BRAZIL 2003 60 MEXICO 2003 19 
BRAZIL 2004 62 MEXICO 2004 19 
BRAZIL 2005 55 MEXICO 2005 7 
BRAZIL 2006 40 MEXICO 2006 8 
CHILE 1996 27 PARAGUAY 1996 10 
CHILE 1997 22 PARAGUAY 1997 12 
CHILE 1998 25 PARAGUAY 1998 19 
CHILE 1999 25 PARAGUAY 1999 20 
CHILE 2000 25 PARAGUAY 2000 20 
CHILE 2001 22 PARAGUAY 2001 20 
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CHILE 2002 20 PARAGUAY 2002 14 
CHILE 2003 21 PARAGUAY 2003 13 
CHILE 2004 20 PARAGUAY 2004 12 
CHILE 2005 20 PARAGUAY 2005 12 
CHILE 2006 21 PARAGUAY 2006 12 
CHINA 1996 18 PERU 1996 22 
CHINA 1997 21 PERU 1997 15 
CHINA 1998 23 PERU 1998 19 
CHINA 1999 26 PERU 1999 12 
CHINA 2000 28 PERU 2000 15 
CHINA 2001 26 PERU 2001 12 
CHINA 2002 36 PERU 2002 12 
CHINA 2003 44 PERU 2003 11 
CHINA 2004 57 PERU 2004 12 
CHINA 2005 65 PERU 2005 10 
CHINA 2006 54 PERU 2006 11 
COLOMBIA 1996 28 PHILIPPINES 1996 20 
COLOMBIA 1997 29 PHILIPPINES 1997 22 
COLOMBIA 1998 26 PHILIPPINES 1998 25 
COLOMBIA 1999 21 PHILIPPINES 1999 22 
COLOMBIA 2000 22 PHILIPPINES 2000 24 
COLOMBIA 2001 24 PHILIPPINES 2001 26 
COLOMBIA 2002 25 PHILIPPINES 2002 31 
COLOMBIA 2003 25 PHILIPPINES 2003 32 
COLOMBIA 2004 24 PHILIPPINES 2004 17 
COLOMBIA 2005 16 PHILIPPINES 2005 21 
COLOMBIA 2006 15 PHILIPPINES 2006 23 
HONG 
KONG 
1996 27 SINGAPORE 1996 15 
HONG 
KONG 
1997 30 SINGAPORE 1997 14 
HONG 
KONG 
1998 33 SINGAPORE 1998 12 
HONG 
KONG 
1999 31 SINGAPORE 1999 12 
HONG 
KONG 
2000 30 SINGAPORE 2000 13 
HONG 
KONG 
2001 25 SINGAPORE 2001 11 
HONG 
KONG 
2002 25 SINGAPORE 2002 8 
HONG 
KONG 
2003 26 SINGAPORE 2003 10 
HONG 2004 25 SINGAPORE 2004 8 
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KONG 
HONG 
KONG 
2005 17 SINGAPORE 2005 10 
HONG 
KONG 
2006 12 SINGAPORE 2006 8 
INDIA 1996 61 THAILAND 1996 18 
INDIA 1997 57 THAILAND 1997 19 
INDIA 1998 62 THAILAND 1998 18 
INDIA 1999 61 THAILAND 1999 15 
INDIA 2000 60 THAILAND 2000 16 
INDIA 2001 58 THAILAND 2001 17 
INDIA 2002 58 THAILAND 2002 17 
INDIA 2003 54 THAILAND 2003 17 
INDIA 2004 57 THAILAND 2004 15 
INDIA 2005 53 THAILAND 2005 15 
INDIA 2006 46 THAILAND 2006 17 
INDONESIA 1996 65 URUGUAY 1996 11 
INDONESIA 1997 37 URUGUAY 1997 13 
INDONESIA 1998 44 URUGUAY 1998 17 
INDONESIA 1999 39 URUGUAY 1999 17 
INDONESIA 2000 29 URUGUAY 2000 34 
INDONESIA 2001 38 URUGUAY 2001 30 
INDONESIA 2002 35 URUGUAY 2002 21 
INDONESIA 2003 43 URUGUAY 2003 26 
INDONESIA 2004 42 URUGUAY 2004 21 
INDONESIA 2005 42 URUGUAY 2005 15 
INDONESIA 2006 35 URUGUAY 2006 21 
JAPAN 1996 148 VENEZUELA 1996 14 
JAPAN 1997 148 VENEZUELA 1997 20 
JAPAN 1998 144 VENEZUELA 1998 21 
JAPAN 1999 139 VENEZUELA 1999 39 
JAPAN 2000 137 VENEZUELA 2000 34 
JAPAN 2001 133 VENEZUELA 2001 31 
JAPAN 2002 130 VENEZUELA 2002 21 
JAPAN 2003 125 VENEZUELA 2003 18 
JAPAN 2004 127 VENEZUELA 2004 19 
JAPAN 2005 124 VENEZUELA 2005 13 
JAPAN 2006 124 VENEZUELA 2006 9 
Note: 1.The negative values of interest rate, total assets, loans, deposits and liquidity 
are      removed from our data sample.  
2. The following types of banks are deleted from the sample: the ratio of total loans to 
total assets is less than 20%; the bank’s total assets increase by more than 50% relative 
to the previous period; and the bank’s total assets fall by more than 50% relative to the 
previous period.  
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Table 1.2  Summary statistics for the whole sample 
Variable   Mean  Std Dev   Minimum   Maximum 
loans 10302.01 45751.29 0.606 951541.70 
total assets 17180.04 76812.16 1.597 1413755.91 
total deposit 13727.05 60059.17 0.0096 1090128.93 
liquid assets 3610.52 14142.70 0.002 425328.94 
 HHI 1044 547 522 3272 
CR3 45% 13% 24% 96% 
CR5 59% 14% 36% 99% 
Note: The unit is million 2000 US dollar. Data are real variables. 
 
 
 
Table 1.3  Summary statistics for Asia sample 
Variable   Mean  Std Dev   Minimum   Maximum 
loans 16689.62 58601.17 3.283 951541.70 
total assets 27512.12 98407.13 4.082 1413755.91 
total deposit 21995.63 76539.92 0.013 1090128.93 
liquid assets 5590.80 21946.40 0.002 425328.94 
 HHI 1023 612 522 3272 
CR3 46% 14% 24% 96% 
CR5 58% 15% 38% 99% 
Note: The unit is million 2000 US dollar. Data are real variables. 
           
 
 
Table 1.4  Summary statistics for Latin America sample 
Variable   Mean  Std Dev   Minimum   Maximum 
loans 1053.36 2739.59 0.606 33945.33 
total assets 2220.19 6662.40 1.597 121963.98 
total deposit 1461.15 4075.29 0.0096 59272.57 
liquid assets 743.26 2857.15 0.054 58226.07 
 HHI 1074 435 553 2769 
CR3 45% 11% 28% 80% 
CR5 59% 12% 36% 90% 
Note: The unit is million 2000 US dollar. Data are real variables. 
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Table 1.5  The estimation results for the whole sample, Concentration measure: 
HHI  
Variable Whole sample 
(GLS) 
Whole sample 
(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.247*** 
(.0875) 
1.196*** 
(.0935) 
sizelag1 -0.003 
(.0021) 
-0.032*** 
(.0072) 
liquiditylag1 0.308*** 
(.0205) 
0.873*** 
(.0349) 
capitalizationlag1 0.001*** 
(.0003) 
0.004*** 
(.0006) 
deltamp -0.628*** 
(.1419) 
-0.596*** 
(.1472) 
HHI -0.049 
(.0667) 
-0.540*** 
(.1520) 
deltamp*HHI 5.143*** 
(1.0319) 
4.964*** 
(1.1039) 
cons -0.069*** 
(.0145) 
-0.150*** 
(.0207) 
R2  0.20 
No. of obs. 6129 6129 
 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 1.6  Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy for the whole sample 
   Whole sample 
(GLS) 
Whole sample  
(FE) 
HHI= 1060 (sample mean) -0.085% -0.072% 
HHI= 550 (10% decile) -0.344% -0.322% 
HHI= 640 (25% decile) -0.296% -0.276% 
HHI= 880 (50% decile) -0.173% -0.157% 
Note: Different values of HHI are taken according to HHI’s distribution, so the sample 
mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of HHI sample distribution are given in the table 
above.  
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Table 1.7 The estimation results for Latin American and Asian countries sample, 
Concentration measure: HHI 
Variable Latin America 
(GLS)  
Latin America 
(FE)  
Asia 
(GLS) 
Asia 
 (FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.040*** 
(.1922) 
1.168*** 
(.1917) 
1.312*** 
(.0862) 
1.259*** 
(.1151) 
sizelag1 0.002 
(.0049) 
-0.090*** 
(.0183) 
-0.005*** 
(.0018) 
-0.014** 
(.0060) 
liquiditylag1 0.421*** 
(.0408) 
1.022*** 
(.0607) 
0.243*** 
(.0201) 
0.675*** 
(.0388) 
capitalizationlag1 0.002*** 
(.0005) 
0.006*** 
(.0010) 
-0.001 
(.0004) 
0.002*** 
(.0007) 
deltamp -0.532*** 
(.2133) 
-0.478** 
(.2128) 
-3.883*** 
(.3894) 
-2.290*** 
(.4426) 
HHI 0.468*** 
(.1960) 
-0.233 
(.3297) 
-0.011 
(.0554) 
-0.110 
(.1576) 
deltamp*HHI 4.164*** 
(1.5060) 
3.736*** 
(1.5450) 
33.502*** 
(3.2496) 
20.156*** 
(3.735) 
cons -0.177*** 
(.0457) 
-0.357*** 
(.0621) 
-0.024** 
(.0121) 
-0.149*** 
(.0245) 
R2  0.22  0.24 
No. of obs. 2459 2459 3670 3670 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 1.8 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for the Latin American and Asian countries 
sample 
 
   Latin America 
(GLS) 
Latin America  
(FE) 
     HHI=      1060       (sample mean)      -0.088%       -0.080% 
     HHI=      660       (10% decile)      -0.256%       -0.230% 
     HHI=      720       (25% decile)      -0.232%       -0.208% 
     HHI=      960       (50% decile)       -0.131%        -0.119% 
   Asia (GLS) Asia (FE) 
HHI= 1050 (sample mean) -0.374% -0.178% 
HHI= 530 (10% decile) -2.091% -1.211% 
HHI= 590 (25% decile) -1.911% -1.103% 
HHI= 790 (50% decile) -1.224% -0.690% 
Note: Different values of HHI are taken according to HHI’s distribution, so the sample 
mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of HHI sample distribution are given in the table 
above.  
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Table 1.9 The estimation results for Large and small size banks, Concentration measure: HHI 
 
Variable largesize 
(GLS) 
largesize 
(FE) 
smallsize (GLS) smallsize (FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.274*** 
(.0940) 
1.110*** 
(.1049) 
1.340*** 
(.1557) 
1.347*** 
(.1686) 
sizelag1 -0.009*** 
(.0033) 
-0.048*** 
(.0102) 
-0.005 
(.0058) 
-0.081*** 
(.0186) 
liquiditylag1 0.266*** 
(.0223) 
0.549*** 
(.0458) 
0.353*** 
(.0356) 
1.045*** 
(.0567) 
capitalizationlag1 0.000 
(.0005) 
0.003*** 
(.0009) 
0.001** 
(.0004) 
0.003*** 
(.0009) 
deltamp -0.450*** 
(.1494) 
-0.329** 
(.1609) 
-0.634*** 
(.2496) 
-0.566** 
(.2449) 
HHI 0.019 
(.0725) 
-0.420*** 
(.1717) 
-0.190 
(.1194) 
-0.495* 
(.2704) 
deltamp*HHI 3.646*** 
(1.0894) 
2.623** 
(1.1963) 
4.811*** 
(1.7692) 
4.462*** 
(1.8249) 
cons -0.012 
(.0166) 
0.003 
(.0281) 
-0.078*** 
(.0275) 
-0.311*** 
(.0405) 
       R2  0.16  0.21 
       No. of obs. 3204 3204 2765 2765 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Small size and large size subsamples are separated by the median of size.  
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Table 1.10 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for Large and small size banks 
 
   Large size 
(GLS) 
Large size (FE) 
HHI= 1040 (sample mean) -0.070% -0.055% 
HHI= 550 (10% decile) -0.248% -0.183% 
HHI= 650 (25% decile) -0.214% -0.159% 
HHI= 900 (50% decile) -0.123% -0.093% 
   Small size (GLS) Small size (FE) 
      HHI= 1070 (sample mean) -0.121% -0.090% 
      HHI= 550 (10% decile) -0.368% -0.320% 
      HHI= 640 (25% decile) -0.324% -0.279% 
      HHI= 880 (50% decile) -0.209% -0.172% 
Note: Different values of HHI are taken according to HHI’s distribution, so the sample 
mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of the HHI sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 1.11 The estimation results for high and low liquidity banks, Concentration 
measure: HHI 
 
Variable highliquidity 
(GLS) 
highliquidity 
(FE) 
lowliquidity 
(GLS) 
lowliquidity 
(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.333*** 
(.1558) 
1.089*** 
(.1622) 
1.246*** 
(.1032) 
1.255*** 
(.1115) 
sizelag1 0.008** 
(.0037) 
-0.058*** 
(.0164) 
-0.010*** 
(.0023) 
-0.050*** 
(.0082) 
liquiditylag1 0.650*** 
(.0468) 
1.172*** 
(.0650) 
0.414*** 
(.0652) 
0.684*** 
(.0847) 
capitalizationlag1 0.001** 
(.0005) 
0.003*** 
(.0012) 
0.001** 
(.0003) 
0.004*** 
(.0007) 
deltamp -0.499** 
(.2153) 
0.241 
(.2438) 
-0.532*** 
(.1460) 
-0.693*** 
(.1497) 
HHI -0.302*** 
(.1172) 
-1.099** 
(.2842) 
0.222*** 
(.0791) 
-0.096 
(.1593) 
deltamp*HHI 5.237*** 
(1.5539) 
-1.649 
(1.9339) 
2.783*** 
(.9910) 
4.794*** 
(1.0505) 
cons -0.192*** 
(.0307) 
-0.333*** 
(.0444) 
-0.071*** 
(.0180) 
-0.071*** 
(.0228) 
R2  0.21  0.17 
No. of obs. 2640 2640 3092 3092 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Low liquidity and high liquidity subsamples are separated by the median of liquidity.  
 
 
Table 1.12 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for high and low liquidity banks 
   highliquidity (GLS) highliquidity (FE) 
HHI= 950 (sample mean) -0.002%  
HHI= 610 (10% decile) -0.179%  
HHI= 700 (25% decile) -0.130%  
HHI= 920 (50% decile) -0.019%  
   lowliquidity (GLS) lowliquidity (FE) 
HHI= 1050 (sample mean) -0.241% -0.192% 
HHI= 530 (10% decile) -0.383% -0.437% 
HHI= 590 (25% decile) -0.369% -0.413% 
HHI= 860 (50% decile) -0.294% -0.283% 
Note: Different values of HHI are taken according to HHI’s distribution, so the sample 
mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of HHI sample distribution are given in the table 
above. 
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Table 1.13 The estimation results for high and low capitalization banks, Concentration measure: HHI 
Variable highcapitalization 
(GLS) 
highcapitalization 
(FE) 
lowcapitalization 
(GLS) 
lowcapitalization 
(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.254*** 
(.1686) 
1.252*** 
(.1686) 
1.225*** 
(.0958) 
1.139*** 
(.1107) 
sizelag1 0.001 
(.0040) 
-0.031** 
(.0158) 
-0.010*** 
(.0022) 
-0.081*** 
(.0099) 
liquiditylag1 0.406*** 
(.0404) 
1.057*** 
(.0632) 
0.247*** 
(.0204) 
0.587*** 
(.0427) 
capitalizationlag1 0.002*** 
(.0005) 
0.007*** 
(.0011) 
0.006*** 
(.0007) 
0.006*** 
(.0010) 
deltamp -0.375* 
(.2157) 
-0.240 
(.2386) 
-0.735*** 
(.1671) 
-0.897*** 
(.1858) 
HHI -0.229 
(.1449) 
-1.127** 
(.3585) 
0.218*** 
(.0679) 
-0.252** 
(.1401) 
deltamp*HHI 2.639* 
(1.5162) 
1.852 
(1.8342) 
5.380*** 
(1.2243) 
6.371*** 
(1.3670) 
cons -0.134*** 
(.0345) 
-0.327*** 
(.0597) 
-0.063*** 
(.0135) 
-0.072*** 
(.0183) 
R2  0.23  0.19 
No. of obs. 2667 2667 3198 3198 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Low capitalization and high capitalization subsamples are separated by the median of capitalization.  
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Table 1.14 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for high and low capitalization banks 
 
   High capitalization 
(GLS) 
High 
capitalization 
(FE) 
HHI= 1160 (sample mean) -0.068%           - 
HHI= 660 (10% decile) -0.200%           - 
HHI= 760 (25% decile) -0.173%           - 
HHI= 1020 (50% decile) -0.106%           - 
   Low capitalization 
(GLS) 
Low 
capitalization 
(FE) 
HHI=          950 (sample mean) -0.224% -0.293% 
HHI=         530 (10% decile) -0.448% -0.557% 
HHI=         590 (25% decile) -0.420% -0.524% 
HHI=         710 (50% decile) -0.355% -0.448% 
Note: Different values of HHI are taken according to HHI’s distribution, so the sample 
mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of HHI sample distribution are given in the table 
above.  
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Table 1.15  The estimation results for the whole sample, Concentration measure: 
CR3 
Variable Whole sample 
(GLS) 
Whole sample 
(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.061*** 
(.0897) 
1.033*** 
(.0983) 
sizelag1 -0.003 
(.0021) 
-0.031*** 
(.0072) 
liquiditylag1 0.327*** 
(.0204) 
0.878*** 
(.0351) 
capitalizationlag1 0.001** 
(.0003) 
0.004*** 
(.0006) 
deltamp -2.586*** 
(.2678) 
-1.844*** 
(.2759) 
CR3 0.011 
(.0274) 
-0.071 
(.0665) 
deltamp*CR3 5.218*** 
(.5247) 
3.784*** 
(.5442) 
cons -0.075*** 
(.0177) 
-0.163*** 
(.0309) 
R2  0.20 
No. of obs. 6129 6129 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 1.16 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for the whole sample 
   Whole sample 
(GLS) 
Whole sample (FE) 
CR3= 0.462 (sample mean) -0.177% -0.097% 
CR3= 0.333 (10% decile) -0.847% -0.583% 
CR3= 0.359 (25% decile) -0.710% -0.483% 
CR3= 0.414 (50% decile) -0.425% -0.277% 
Note: Different values of CR3 are taken according to CR3’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of CR3 sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 1.17 The estimation results for Latin American and Asian countries 
sample, Concentration measure: CR3 
Variable Latin America 
(GLS) 
Latin America 
(FE) 
Asia (GLS) Asia (FE) 
deltalnrgdp 0.910*** 
(.1952) 
1.155*** 
(.1926) 
1.184*** 
(.0850) 
0.975*** 
(.1147) 
sizelag1 0.002 
(.0049) 
-0.092*** 
(.0183) 
-0.005*** 
(.0018) 
-0.009 
(.0059) 
liquiditylag1 0.430*** 
(.0406) 
1.024*** 
(.0607) 
0.260*** 
(.0198) 
0.667*** 
(.0387) 
capitalizationlag1 0.002*** 
(.0005) 
0.006*** 
(.0010) 
-0.001* 
(.0004) 
0.002*** 
(.0006) 
deltamp -2.015*** 
(.5550) 
-1.476*** 
(.5438) 
-4.876*** 
(.3397) 
-4.254*** 
(.4027) 
CR3 0.239*** 
(.0735) 
0.122 
(.1430) 
-0.003 
(.0231) 
-0.021 
(.0721) 
deltamp*CR3 4.111*** 
(1.1123) 
3.069*** 
(1.0942) 
8.331*** 
(.5654) 
7.383*** 
(.6748) 
cons -0.224*** 
(.0517) 
-0.449*** 
(.0835) 
-0.019 
(.0145) 
-0.133*** 
(.0384) 
R2  0.22  0.26 
No. of obs. 2459 2459 3670 3670 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 1.18 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for Latin American and Asian countries sample 
   Latin America 
(GLS) 
 Latin America 
(FE) 
CR3= 0.451 (sample mean) -0.162% -0.093% 
CR3= 0.340 (10% decile) -0.619% -0.434% 
CR3= 0.377 (25% decile) -0.465% -0.319% 
CR3= 0.428 (50% decile) -0.256% -0.163% 
   Asia (GLS) Asia (FE) 
CR3= 0.470 (sample mean) -0.957% -0.781% 
CR3= 0.333 (10% decile) -2.101% -1.794% 
CR3= 0.353 (25% decile) -1.937% -1.649% 
CR3= 0.404 (50% decile) -1.509% -1.270% 
Note: Different values of CR3 are taken according to CR3’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of CR3 sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 1.19 The estimation results for large and small size banks, Concentration measure: CR3 
Variable largesize 
(GLS) 
largesize 
(FE) 
smallsize 
(GLS) 
smallsize 
(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.123*** 
(.0951) 
1.037*** 
(.1085) 
1.171*** 
(.1620) 
1.200*** 
(.1788) 
sizelag1 -0.009*** 
(.0033) 
-0.049*** 
(.0102) 
-0.004 
(.0058) 
-0.079*** 
(.0186) 
liquiditylag1 0.283*** 
(.0222) 
0.545*** 
(.0459) 
0.370*** 
(.0357) 
1.053*** 
(.0569) 
capitalizationlag1 0.000 
(.0005) 
0.002*** 
(.0009) 
0.001* 
(.0004) 
0.003*** 
(.0009) 
deltamp -2.321*** 
(.2965) 
-1.179*** 
(.3327) 
-2.349*** 
(.4685) 
-1.573*** 
(.4576) 
CR3 0.029 
(.0296) 
-0.029 
(.0752) 
-0.042 
(.0496) 
-0.082 
(.1201) 
deltamp*CR3 4.673*** 
(.5842) 
2.409*** 
(.6603) 
4.654*** 
(.9117) 
3.152*** 
(.8985) 
cons -0.014 
(.0195) 
-0.016 
(.0381) 
-0.073** 
(.0330) 
-0.314*** 
(.0586) 
      R2  0.16  0.21 
      No. of obs. 3204 3204 2765 2765 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Small size and large size subsamples are separated by the median of size.  
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Table 1.20 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change in the stance of monetary policy, 
for large and small size banks 
   largesize (GLS) largesize (FE) 
CR3= 0.458 (sample mean) -0.183% -0.076% 
CR3= 0.333 (10% decile) -0.764% -0.376% 
CR3= 0.359 (25% decile) -0.641% -0.312% 
CR3= 0.412 (50% decile) -0.398% -0.187% 
   smallsize 
(GLS) 
smallsize (FE) 
CR3= 0.466 (sample mean) -0.182% -0.105% 
CR3= 0.333 (10% decile) -0.798% -0.522% 
CR3= 0.359 (25% decile) -0.676% -0.439% 
CR3= 0.420 (50% decile) -0.393% -0.248% 
Note: Different values of CR3 are taken according to CR3’s distribution, so the sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles 
of CR3 sample distribution are given in the table above.  
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Table 1.21 The estimation results for high and low liquidity banks, Concentration measure: CR3 
Variable highliquidity 
(GLS) 
highliquidity 
(FE) 
lowliquidity 
(GLS) 
lowliquidity 
(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.089*** 
(.1633) 
0.855*** 
(.1729) 
1.243*** 
(.1037) 
1.270*** 
(.1131) 
sizelag1 0.008** 
(.0037) 
-0.057*** 
(.0164) 
-0.010*** 
(.0023) 
-0.051*** 
(.0083) 
liquiditylag1 0.662*** 
(.0465) 
1.165*** 
(.0649) 
0.418*** 
(.0648) 
0.685*** 
(.0850) 
capitalizationlag1 0.001** 
(.0005) 
0.002** 
(.0012) 
0.001*** 
(.0003) 
0.004*** 
(.0007) 
deltamp -2.206*** 
(.3996) 
-1.673*** 
(.4042) 
-1.129*** 
(.3196) 
-0.801*** 
(.3249) 
CR3 -0.083** 
(.0438) 
-0.219** 
(.1117) 
0.096*** 
(.0351) 
0.025 
(.0797) 
deltamp*CR3 4.695*** 
(.7739) 
3.441*** 
(.7998) 
1.936*** 
(.6236) 
1.538*** 
(.6384) 
cons -0.182*** 
(.0333) 
-0.328*** 
(.0557) 
-0.095*** 
(.0229) 
-0.092*** 
(.0376) 
R2  0.21  0.16 
No. of obs. 2640 2640 3092 3092 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Low liquidity and high liquidity subsamples are separated by the median of liquidity.  
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Table 1.22 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change in the stance of monetary policy, 
for high and low liquidity banks 
   highliquidity 
(GLS) 
highliquidity (FE) 
     CR3=         0.464      (sample mean)      -0.028%     -0.077% 
     CR3=      0.339      (10% decile)      -0.615%     -0.507% 
     CR3=      0.359      (25% decile)      -0.520%     -0.437% 
     CR3=      0.420      (50% decile)      -0.233%      -0.227% 
   lowliquidity 
(GLS) 
lowliquidity (FE) 
CR3= 0.459 (sample mean) -0.239% -0.095% 
CR3= 0.332 (10% decile) -0.486% -0.291% 
CR3= 0.367 (25% decile) -0.419% -0.238% 
CR3= 0.409 (50% decile) -0.336% -0.172% 
Note: Different values of CR3 are taken according to CR3’s distribution, so the sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles 
of CR3 sample distribution are given in the table above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.23 The estimation results for high and low capitalization banks, Concentration measure: CR3 
Variable highcapitalization 
(GLS) 
highcapitalization 
(FE) 
lowcapitalization 
(GLS) 
lowcapitalization 
(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.120*** 
(.1660) 
1.113*** 
(.1680) 
1.084*** 
(.0962) 
1.062*** 
(.1168) 
sizelag1 0.000 
(.0038) 
-0.013 
(.0124) 
-0.009*** 
(.0021) 
-0.085*** 
(.0099) 
liquiditylag1 0.401*** 
(.0383) 
0.969*** 
(.0601) 
0.268*** 
(.0206) 
0.592*** 
(.0429) 
capitalizationlag1 0.002*** 
(.0005) 
0.006*** 
(.0010) 
0.004*** 
(.0007) 
0.005*** 
(.0011) 
deltamp -1.499*** 
(.4272) 
-1.539*** 
(.4403) 
-2.755*** 
(.3145) 
-1.333*** 
(.3580) 
CR3 -0.051 
(.0505) 
0.088 
(.1183) 
0.121*** 
(.0298) 
-0.140** 
(.0724) 
deltamp*CR3 2.826*** 
(.8389) 
3.106*** 
(.8810) 
5.337*** 
(.6103) 
2.489*** 
(.6954) 
cons -0.110*** 
(.0377) 
-0.342*** 
(.0603) 
-0.084*** 
(.0174) 
-0.028 
(.0318) 
      R2  0.20  0.19 
      No. of obs. 2667 2667 3198 3198 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Low capitalization and high capitalization subsamples are separated by the median of capitalization.  
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Table 1.24 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change in the stance of monetary policy, 
for high and low capitalization banks 
   highcapitalization 
(GLS) 
highcapitalization 
(FE) 
CR3= 0.486 (sample 
mean) 
-0.125% -0.028% 
CR3= 0.346 (10% decile) -0.520% -0.464% 
CR3= 0.390 (25% decile) -0.398% -0.329% 
CR3= 0.447 (50% decile) -0.236% -0.151% 
   lowcapitalization 
(GLS) 
lowcapitalization 
(FE) 
       CR3=       0.437 (sample mean)        -0.423%         -0.246% 
       CR3=       0.330 (10% decile)        -0.995%         -0.512% 
       CR3=       0.347 (25% decile)        -0.902%          -0.469% 
       CR3=       0.388 (50% decile)         -0.686%          -0.368% 
Note: Different values of CR3 are taken according to CR3’s distribution, so the sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles 
of CR3 sample distribution are given in the table above.  
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Table 1.25 The estimation results for the whole sample, Concentration measure: 
CR5 
Variable Whole sample 
(GLS) 
Whole sample 
(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.092*** 
(.0886) 
1.041*** 
(.0969) 
sizelag1 -0.003 
(.0021) 
-0.031*** 
(.0072) 
liquiditylag1 0.319*** 
(.0205) 
0.872*** 
(.0350) 
capitalizationlag1 0.001*** 
(.0003) 
0.004*** 
(.0006) 
deltamp -3.784*** 
(.3913) 
-3.340*** 
(.4252) 
CR5 0.015 
(.0261) 
-0.051 
(.0711) 
deltamp*CR5 6.010*** 
(.6103) 
5.354*** 
(.6653) 
cons -0.080*** 
(.0201) 
-0.164*** 
(.0411) 
R2  0.20 
No. of obs. 6129 6129 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.26 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for the whole sample 
   Whole sample 
(GLS) 
Whole sample  
(FE) 
CR5= 0.595 (sample mean) -0.207% -0.153% 
CR5= 0.436 (10% decile) -1.163% -1.005% 
CR5= 0.488 (25% decile) -0.851% -0.727% 
CR5= 0.552 (50% decile) -0.468% -0.386% 
Note: Different values of CR5 are taken according to CR5’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of CR5 sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 1.27 The estimation results for Latin American and Asian countries 
sample, Concentration measure: CR5 
Variable Latin America 
(GLS) 
Latin America 
(FE) 
Asia 
(GLS) 
Asia (FE) 
deltalnrgdp 0.985*** 
(.1931) 
1.209*** 
(.1907) 
1.185*** 
(.0849) 
0.966*** 
(.1176) 
sizelag1 0.002 
(.0049) 
-0.092*** 
(.0183) 
-0.005*** 
(.0018) 
-0.011** 
(.0060) 
liquiditylag1 0.429*** 
(.0413) 
1.025*** 
(.0607) 
0.257*** 
(.0199) 
0.658*** 
(.0387) 
capitalizationlag1 0.002*** 
(.0005) 
0.006*** 
(.0010) 
-0.001 
(.0004) 
0.002*** 
(.0006) 
deltamp -1.975*** 
(.7058) 
-2.055*** 
(.7473) 
-7.245*** 
(.4925) 
-6.509*** 
(.6142) 
CR5 0.193*** 
(.0671) 
0.157 
(.1470) 
0.008 
(.0223) 
0.022 
(.0788) 
deltamp*CR5 3.156*** 
(1.1111) 
3.336*** 
(1.1816) 
10.739*** 
(.7203) 
9.761*** 
(.8978) 
cons -0.239*** 
(.0581) 
-0.499*** 
(.1075) 
-0.026 
(.0164) 
-0.155*** 
(.0516) 
R2  0.22  0.26 
No. of obs. 2459 2459 3670 3670 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 1.28 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for Latin American and Asian countries sample 
   Latin America 
(GLS) 
Latin America  
(FE) 
      CR5= 0.593 (sample mean) -0.103% -0.076% 
      CR5= 0.476 (10% decile) -0.472% -0.466% 
      CR5= 0.500 (25% decile) -0.397% -0.387% 
      CR5= 0.578 (50% decile) -0.151% -0.127% 
   Asia (GLS) Asia (FE) 
CR5= 0.597 (sample mean) -0.834% -0.681% 
CR5= 0.436 (10% decile) -2.566% -2.256% 
CR5= 0.459 (25% decile) -2.321% -2.034% 
CR5= 0.530 (50% decile) -1.556% -1.337% 
Note: Different values of CR5 are taken according to CR5’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of CR5 sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 1.29 The estimation results for large and small size banks, Concentration 
measure: CR5 
Variable largesize (GLS) largesize (FE) smallsize (GLS) smallsize (FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.150*** 
(.0943) 
1.022*** 
(.1073) 
1.191*** 
(.1589) 
1.223*** 
(.1758) 
sizelag1 -0.009*** 
(.0033) 
-0.049*** 
(.0102) 
-0.003 
(.0058) 
-0.080*** 
(.0186) 
liquiditylag1 0.274*** 
(.0224) 
0.541*** 
(.0459) 
0.363*** 
(.0357) 
1.044*** 
(.0567) 
capitalizationlag1 0.000 
(.0005) 
0.002** 
(.0009) 
0.001** 
(.0004) 
0.003*** 
(.0009) 
deltamp -3.393*** 
(.4195) 
-2.443*** 
(.4925) 
-3.615*** 
(.7114) 
-2.649*** 
(.7258) 
CR5 0.031 
(.0282) 
-0.034 
(.0798) 
-0.032 
(.0473) 
0.047 
(.1338) 
deltamp*CR5 5.389*** 
(.6581) 
3.901*** 
(.7743) 
5.629*** 
(1.0969) 
4.192*** 
(1.1262) 
cons -0.019 
(.0219) 
-0.006 
(.0482) 
-0.076** 
(.0367) 
-0.374*** 
(.0788) 
R2  0.16  0.21 
No. of obs. 3204 3204 2765 2765 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Small size and large size subsamples are separated by the median of size.  
 
 
Table 1.30 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for large and small size banks 
   largesize (GLS) largesize (FE) 
CR5= 0.592 (sample mean) -0.203% -0.134% 
CR5= 0.439 (10% decile) -1.026% -0.730% 
CR5= 0.488 (25% decile) -0.763% -0.540% 
CR5= 0.552 (50% decile) -0.419% -0.291% 
   smallsize (GLS) smallsize (FE) 
CR5= 0.598 (sample mean) -0.246% -0.140% 
CR5= 0.436 (10% decile) -1.160% -0.820% 
CR5= 0.487 (25% decile) -0.875% -0.608% 
CR5= 0.552 (50% decile) -0.509% -0.336% 
Note: Different values of CR5 are taken according to CR5’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of CR5 sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 1.31 The estimation results for high and low liquidity banks, Concentration measure: CR5 
Variable highliquidity 
(GLS) 
highliquidity 
(FE) 
lowliquidity 
(GLS) 
lowliquidity 
(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.177*** 
(.1597) 
0.938*** 
(.1691) 
1.285*** 
(.1036) 
1.261*** 
(.1127) 
sizelag1 0.008** 
(.0037) 
-0.058*** 
(.0164) 
-0.010*** 
(.0023) 
-0.050*** 
(.0083) 
liquiditylag1 0.651*** 
(.0466) 
1.161*** 
(.0649) 
0.415*** 
(.0651) 
0.689*** 
(.0849) 
capitalizationlag1 0.001** 
(.0005) 
0.002** 
(.0012) 
0.001*** 
(.0003) 
0.004*** 
(.0007) 
deltamp -3.203*** 
(.6166) 
-2.168*** 
(.6623) 
-1.010*** 
(.3994) 
-1.477*** 
(.4304) 
CR5 -0.089** 
(.0426) 
-0.334*** 
(.1223) 
0.071** 
(.0328) 
0.104 
(.0837) 
deltamp*CR5 5.242*** 
(.9487) 
3.463*** 
(1.0337) 
1.348** 
(.6189) 
2.292*** 
(.6719) 
cons -0.171*** 
(.0363) 
-0.245*** 
(.0721) 
-0.094*** 
(.0256) 
-0.137*** 
(.0490) 
       R2  0.21  0.16 
      No. of obs. 2640 2640 3092 3092 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Low liquidity and high liquidity subsamples are separated by the median of liquidity.  
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Table 1.32 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change in the stance of monetary policy, 
for high and low liquidity banks 
   highliquidity 
(GLS) 
highliquidity 
(FE) 
CR5= 0.591 (sample mean) -0.103% -0.121% 
CR5= 0.444 (10% decile) -0.877% -0.632% 
CR5= 0.487 (25% decile) -0.650% -0.483% 
CR5= 0.557 (50% decile) -0.282% -0.239% 
   lowliquidity 
(GLS) 
lowliquidity 
(FE) 
CR5= 0.599 (sample mean) -0.202% -0.104% 
CR5= 0.436 (10% decile) -0.422% -0.478% 
CR5= 0.501 (25% decile) -0.335% -0.329% 
CR5= 0.551 (50% decile) -0.267% -0.214% 
Note: Different values of CR5 are taken according to CR5’s distribution, so the sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles 
of CR5 sample distribution are given in the table above.  
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Table 1.33 The estimation results for high and low capitalization banks, Concentration measure: CR5 
Variable highcapitalization 
(GLS) 
highcapitalization 
(FE) 
lowcapitalization 
(GLS) 
lowcapitalization 
(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.150*** 
(.1638) 
1.169*** 
(.1652) 
1.135*** 
(.0947) 
0.962*** 
(.1167) 
sizelag1 0.000 
(.0038) 
-0.014 
(.0123) 
-0.009*** 
(.0022) 
-0.088*** 
(.0099) 
liquiditylag1 0.396*** 
(.0383) 
0.962*** 
(.0599) 
0.263*** 
(.0210) 
0.596*** 
(.0427) 
capitalizationlag1 0.002*** 
(.0005) 
0.006*** 
(.0010) 
0.005*** 
(.0007) 
0.005*** 
(.0010) 
deltamp -2.155*** 
(.6250) 
-2.656*** 
(.7000) 
-3.219*** 
(.4179) 
-2.862*** 
(.4935) 
CR5 -0.035 
(.0511) 
0.207 
(.1334) 
0.105*** 
(.0273) 
-0.232*** 
(.0737) 
deltamp*CR5 3.225*** 
(.9643) 
4.201*** 
(1.0973) 
5.031*** 
(.6557) 
4.383*** 
(.7718) 
cons -0.114*** 
(.0437) 
-0.419*** 
(.0815) 
-0.094*** 
(.0193) 
0.040 
(.0410) 
R2  0.20  0.20 
No. of obs. 2667 2667 3198 3198 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Low capitalization and high capitalization subsamples are separated by the median of capitalization.  
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Table 1.34 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change in the stance of monetary policy, 
for high and low capitalization banks 
   highcapitalization 
(GLS) 
highcapitalization 
(FE) 
CR5= 0.624 (sample mean) -0.143% -0.035% 
CR5= 0.476 (10% decile) -0.619% -0.655% 
CR5= 0.513 (25% decile) -0.501% -0.501% 
CR5= 0.597 (50% decile) -0.230% -0.148% 
   lowcapitalization 
(GLS) 
lowcapitalization 
(FE) 
CR5= 0.566 (sample mean) -0.369% -0.379% 
CR5= 0.436 (10% decile) -1.027% -0.952% 
CR5= 0.454 (25% decile) -0.936% -0.873% 
CR5= 0.519 (50% decile) -0.609% -0.589% 
Note: Different values of CR5 are taken according to CR5’s distribution, so the sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles 
of CR5 sample distribution are given in the table above.  
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Table 2.1   Summary Statistics for whole data set 
Variable    Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
 interest income 593.39   2145.58   0.02 71146.59 
 interest expense   326.66 1371.79 0.0004 55418.46 
 other income   134.00 540.66   0.0006 9868.28 
 administrative expense 135.42 505.52 0.02 11271.43 
 total deposit mmf  13052.22 62674.46 0.01 1202877.70 
 personnel expense 100.27 313.37 0.02 8070.20 
 loans 10302.01 45751.29 0.61 951541.70 
 total assets 17180.04 76812.16 1.60 1413755.91 
 total deposit 13727.05 60059.17 0.01 1090128.93 
ratio of net loans to asset   52.74% 20.76% 0.01% 99.98% 
   prh 0.36   0.23 -0.20 1.07 
 Note: The unit is million 2000 US dollar. Data are real variables. 
 
 
Table 2.2  Summary Statistics for Asia sample 
Variable    Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
 interest income   807.68 2711.20   0.02 71146.59 
 interest expense   411.72   1716.04   0.004 55418.46 
 other income 190.43   675.22 0.01 9868.28 
 administrative expense 194.27 653.22 0.09 11271.43 
 total deposit mmf 22284.33   83070.22 0.06 1202877.70 
 personnel expense 132.18 336.96   0.09 4800.64 
 loans 16689.62 58601.17 3.28 951541.70 
 total assets 27512.12 98407.13 4.08 1413755.91 
 total deposit 21995.63 76539.92 0.01 1090128.93 
ratio of net loans to asset   57.33% 17.75% 0.01% 99.98% 
   prh 0.27 0.22 -0.20 1.07 
 Note: The unit is million 2000 US dollar. Data are real variables. 
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Table 2.3   Summary Statistics for Latin America sample 
Variable    Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
 interest income 330.92 1055.90 0.06 20799.77 
 interest expense 221.98   744.48 0.0004 13894.01 
 other income 64.51   286.61 0.001 6789.25 
 administrative expense 63.03 188.70 0.02 2309.95 
 total deposit mmf   1660.30   5111.79 0.01   91612.50 
 personnel expense    61.10 276.78 0.02 8070.20 
 loans 1053.36 2739.59 0.61 33945.33 
 total assets 2220.19 6662.40 1.60 121963.98 
 total deposit 1461.15 4075.29 0.01 59272.57 
ratio of net loans to asset 47.07% 22.72%   0.03% 99.72% 
   prh 0.45 0.22 0.11 1.04 
 Note: The unit is million 2000 US dollar. Data are real variables. 
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Table 2.4   Number of observations per country 
 All banks small  medium large 
country No. of obs No. of obs No. of obs No. of obs 
ARGENTINA 462 229 182 51 
BOLIVIA 115 56 45 14 
BRAZIL 908 452 360 96 
CHILE 277 134 110 33 
CHINA 97 46 36 15 
COLOMBIA 250 123 96 31 
HONG KONG 113 53 41 19 
INDIA 649 323 257 69 
INDONESIA 510 251 203 56 
JAPAN 1359 677 542 140 
KOREA  193 94 75 24 
MALAYSIA 293 144 115 34 
MEXICO 155 75 61 19 
PARAGUAY 176 85 67 24 
PERU 151 75 56 20 
PHILIPPINES 279 137 108 34 
SINGAPORE 127 61 49 17 
THAILAND 189 92 75 22 
URUGUAY 262 129 104 29 
VENEZUELA 302 149 118 35 
total  6867 3385 2700 782 
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Table 2.5 PRH statistic for all banks, small banks, medium banks, and large 
banks each country in 1996, 1997 
 
all 
banks  small  medium  large  
 H_1996 H_1997 H_1996 H_1997 H_1996 H_1997 H_1996 H_1997 
ARGENTINA 0.728 0.734 0.631  0.851 0.859 0.762  
BOLIVIA 0.593  0.451  0.606 0.611 0.581  
BRAZIL 0.630 0.637 0.719 0.730 0.418 0.424 0.845 0.838 
CHILE 1.021  1.122  0.683  0.854  
CHINA 0.471  0.586  0.636  0.453  
COLOMBIA 0.573 0.583 0.657 0.667 0.702  0.546  
HONGKONG 0.319 0.327 0.750  0.603 0.485 0.840  
INDIA 0.210 0.219 0.156 0.165 0.491 0.495 0.577 0.582 
INDONESIA 0.647 0.652 0.520 0.525 0.704  0.763  
JAPAN 0.540 0.541 0.483 0.484 0.329 0.332 0.717 0.708 
KOREA 0.664  0.423 0.431 0.743  1.099  
MALAYSIA 0.583 0.587 0.480 0.485 0.603  0.622  
MEXICO 0.678  0.799  0.934 0.969 0.794  
PARAGUAY 0.673 0.688 0.722 0.738 0.653 0.665 0.515 0.540 
PERU 0.869  0.758  0.525  0.732  
PHILIPPINES 0.497 0.505 0.510 0.516 0.409 0.418 0.478  
SINGAPORE 0.514 0.525 0.648  0.318  0.546  
THAILAND 0.987 0.979 1.027 1.012 0.892  0.400  
URUGUAY 0.966  0.925  1.124 1.111 0.674  
VENEZUELA 0.788 0.795 0.803 0.813 0.843  1.108  
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Table 2.6 PRH statistic for all banks, small banks, medium banks, and large 
banks each country in 2006 
 all banks small medium large 
 H_2006 H_2006 H_2006 H_2006 
ARGENTINA 0.787 0.631 0.931 0.762 
BOLIVIA 0.593 0.451 0.660 0.581 
BRAZIL 0.701 0.834 0.481 0.778 
CHILE 1.021 1.122 0.683 0.854 
CHINA 0.471 0.586 0.636 0.453 
COLOMBIA 0.684 0.761 0.702 0.546 
HONGKONG 0.402 0.75       0.069 0.84 
INDIA       0.323       0.280       0.540       0.634 
INDONESIA       0.693       0.574 0.704 0.763 
JAPAN       0.551       0.498       0.361       0.634 
KOREA 0.664       0.508 0.743 1.099 
MALAYSIA       0.621       0.533 0.603 0.622 
MEXICO 0.678 0.799       1.351 0.794 
PARAGUAY       0.835       0.897       0.782       0.831 
PERU 0.869 0.758 0.525 0.732 
PHILIPPINES       0.581       0.580       0.507 0.478 
SINGAPORE       0.637 0.648 0.318 0.546 
THAILAND 0.908 0.893 0.892 0.4 
URUGUAY 0.966 0.925       1.002 0.674 
VENEZUELA       0.864       0.908 0.843 1.108 
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Table 2.7  The estimation results for the whole sample  
Variable Whole 
sample(GLS) 
Whole 
sample(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.222*** 
(.114) 
1.311*** 
(.112) 
sizelag1 -.003  
(.003) 
-.107*** 
(.013) 
liquiditylag1 .267*** 
(029) 
.691*** 
(.043) 
capitalizationlag1 -.005 
(.037) 
.417*** 
(.080) 
deltamp -.649*** 
(.124) 
-.389*** 
(.116) 
prh .011 
(.027) 
.015  
(.026) 
deltamp*prh 1.169*** 
(.208) 
.806*** 
(.193) 
cons -.102*** 
(.027) 
-.260*** 
(.026) 
R2  0.18 
No. of obs. 4182 4182 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 2.8 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for the whole sample  
   Whole 
sample (GLS) 
Whole 
sample (FE) 
prh= 0.356 
 
(sample mean) -0.233% -0.103% 
prh= 0.123 
 
(10% decile) -0.505% -0.291% 
prh= 0.158 
 
(25% decile) -0.464% -0.262% 
prh= 0.309 
 
(50% decile) -0.288% -0.141% 
 Note: Different values of PRH are taken according to PRH’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of PRH sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 2.9  The estimation results for Latin America subsample  
Variable Latin(GLS) Latin(FE) 
deltalnrgdp .814*** 
(.200) 
1.088*** 
(.203) 
sizelag1 -.003 
(.005) 
-.081*** 
(.020) 
liquiditylag1 .237*** 
(.047) 
.623*** 
(.070) 
capitalizationlag1 .019 
(.056) 
.673*** 
(.121) 
deltamp -.750*** 
(.198) 
-.341* 
(.188) 
prh -.090 * 
(.055) 
-.044  
(.052) 
deltamp*prh 1.139*** 
(.309) 
.608** 
(.290) 
cons .002 
(.044) 
-.278*** 
(.049) 
R2  0.16 
No. of obs. 1923 1923 
 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 2.10 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for Latin America subsample 
   Latin (GLS) Latin (FE) 
prh= 0.449 
 
(sample mean) -0.239% -0.068% 
prh= 0.188 
 
(10% decile) -0.536% -0.227% 
prh= 0.303 
 
(25% decile) -0.405% -0.157% 
prh= 0.390 
 
(50% decile) -0.306% -0.104% 
 Note: Different values of PRH are taken according to PRH’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of PRH sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 2.11  The estimation results for Asia subsample  
Variable Asia(GLS) Asia(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.976*** 
(.130) 
1.835*** 
(.1229) 
sizelag1 -.001  
(.003) 
-.103*** 
(.015) 
liquiditylag1 .290*** 
(.031) 
.775*** 
(.046) 
capitalizationlag1 -.066 
(.056) 
.043 
(.106) 
deltamp -2.435*** 
(.228) 
-2.538*** 
(.229) 
prh .085***  
(.024) 
.072***  
(.023) 
deltamp*prh 7.076*** 
(.714) 
7.834*** 
(.716) 
cons -.148*** 
(.028) 
-.252*** 
(.021) 
R2  0.37 
No. of obs. 2259 2259 
 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 2.12 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for Asia subsample 
   Asia (GLS) Asia (FE) 
prh= 0.271 
 
(sample mean) -0.515% -0.412% 
prh= 0.077 
 
(10% decile) -1.891% -1.936% 
prh= 0.124 
 
(25% decile) -1.560% -1.570% 
prh= 0.196 
 
(50% decile) -1.049% -1.003% 
 Note: Different values of PRH are taken according to PRH’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of PRH sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 2.13  The estimation results for large and small size banks  
Variable large 
size(GLS) 
large 
size(FE) 
Small 
size(GLS) 
Small 
size(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.154*** 
(.131) 
1.099*** 
(.128) 
1.362*** 
(.187) 
1.361*** 
(.198) 
sizelag1 -.009**  
(.004) 
-.118***  
(.016) 
-.011 
(.009) 
-.143*** 
(.025) 
liquiditylag1 .289*** 
(.038) 
.482*** 
(.057) 
.257*** 
(.044) 
.862*** 
(.069) 
capitalizationlag1 .172** 
(.086) 
.656*** 
(.153) 
-.016 
(.053) 
.269** 
(.114) 
deltamp -.268* 
(.148) 
-.039 
(.142) 
-.633***  
(.205) 
-.496**  
(.199) 
prh .027  
(.029) 
.028  
(.028) 
-.009 
(.045) 
-.008  
(.046) 
deltamp*prh .642*** 
(.239) 
.270 
(.227) 
1.024***  
(.370) 
.824**  
(.353) 
cons -.125*** 
(.033) 
.010 
(.036) 
-.106*** 
(.038) 
-.389*** 
(.039) 
R2  0.18  0.20 
No. of obs. 2063 2063 1984 1984 
 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Small size and large size subsamples are separated by the median of size. 
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Table 2.14 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for large and small size banks 
   large size(GLS) large size(FE) 
prh= 0.365 
 
(sample mean) -0.034% 0.060% 
 
prh= 0.123 
 
(10% decile) -0.190% -0.006% 
 
prh= 0.175 
 
(25% decile) -0.156% 0.008% 
 
prh= 0.319 
 
(50% decile) -0.063% 0.0481% 
 
   Small size(GLS) Small size(FE) 
prh= 0.347 
 
(sample mean) -0.278% -0.210% 
prh= 0.123 
 
(10% decile) -0.507% -0.394% 
prh= 0.158 
 
(25% decile) -0.471% -0.365% 
prh= 0.303 
 
(50% decile) -0.323% -0.246% 
Note: Different values of PRH are taken according to PRH’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of PRH sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
Table 2.15  The estimation results for high and low liquidity banks 
Variable high 
liquidity(GLS) 
high 
liquidity(FE) 
low 
liquidity(GLS) 
low 
liquidity(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.259*** 
(.192) 
1.111*** 
(.198) 
1.238*** 
(.130) 
1.146*** 
(.121) 
sizelag1 .009***  
(.005) 
-.1542*** 
(.025) 
-.012*** 
(.003) 
-.100*** 
(.012) 
liquiditylag1 .415*** 
(.053) 
.661*** 
(.075) 
.622*** 
(.057) 
.979*** 
(.067) 
capitalizationlag1 .028 
(.063) 
.232 
(.163) 
.005 
(.045) 
.719*** 
(.093 
deltamp -.329 
(.206) 
-.114 
(.201) 
-.915*** 
(.140) 
-.533***  
(.127) 
prh .021  
(.041) 
.034  
(.041) 
.070**  
(.035) 
.011  
(.032) 
deltamp*prh .792** 
(.388) 
.449 
(.372) 
1.542***  
(.218) 
1.017***  
(.194) 
cons -.147*** 
(.040) 
-.201*** 
(.050) 
-.204*** 
(.032) 
-.236*** 
(.020) 
R2  0.15  0.29 
No. of obs. 1820 1820 2045 2045 
 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 Low liquidity and high liquidity subsamples are separated by the median of liquidity.  
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Table 2.16 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for high and low liquidity banks 
   high liquidity(GLS) high liquidity(FE) 
prh= 0.411 
 
(sample mean) -0.004% 0.070% 
prh= 0.140 
 
(10% decile) -0.218% -0.051% 
prh= 0.266 
 
(25% decile) -0.118% 0.006% 
prh= 0.365 
 
(50% decile) -0.040% 0.050% 
   low liquidity(GLS) low liquidity(FE) 
prh= 0.306 
 
(sample mean) -0.442% -0.221% 
prh= 0.123 
 
(10% decile) -0.725% -0.407% 
prh= 0.124 
 
(25% decile) -0.723% -0.407% 
prh= 0.250 
 
(50% decile) -0.529% -0.278% 
 Note: Different values of PRH are taken according to PRH’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of PRH sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 2.17  The estimation results for high and low capitalization banks 
Variable high 
capitalization(GLS) 
high 
capitalization(FE) 
low 
capitalization(GLS) 
low 
capitalization(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.278*** 
(.173) 
1.397*** 
(.182) 
1.038*** 
(.1472) 
1.038*** 
(.137) 
sizelag1 .001  
(.005) 
-.091***  
(.022) 
-.010*** 
(.002) 
-.156*** 
(.016) 
liquiditylag1 .263*** 
(.045) 
.760*** 
(.073) 
.293*** 
(.034) 
.537*** 
(.051) 
capitalizationlag1 .067 
(.054) 
.509*** 
(.118) 
.479*** 
(.197 
.504** 
(.243) 
deltamp -.690*** 
(.183) 
-.517*** 
(.181 
.378**  
(.190) 
.124  
(.1789) 
prh -.030  
(.050) 
-.092*  
(.053) 
.074***  
(.024) 
.114***  
(.022) 
deltamp*prh 1.044*** 
(.334) 
.873*** 
(.330) 
-.199  
(.283) 
-.001  
(.264) 
cons -.120*** 
(.041) 
-.266*** 
(.045) 
-.123*** 
(.029) 
-.099*** 
(.023) 
R2  0.20  0.20 
No. of obs. 1965 1965 1994 1994 
 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Low capitalization and high capitalization subsamples are separated by the median of capitalization.  
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Table 2.18 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for high capitalization banks 
   high 
capitalization(GLS) 
high 
capitalization(FE) 
prh= 0.420 
 
(sample mean) -0.252% -0.150% 
prh= 0.155 
 
(10% decile) -0.528% -0.381% 
prh= 0.299 
 
(25% decile) -0.378% -0.256% 
prh= 0.365 
 
(50% decile) -0.309% -0.198% 
 Note: Different values of PRH are taken according to PRH’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of PRH sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 2.19  The bootstrap estimation results for the whole sample  
Variable whole 
sample(GLS) 
whole 
sample(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.274** 
(.123) 
1.280** 
(.155) 
sizelag1 -.004**  
(.002) 
-.110** 
(.020) 
liquiditylag1 .214** 
(.036) 
.670** 
(.065) 
capitalizationlag1 -.062  
(.065) 
.392** 
(.164) 
deltamp -.544** 
(.206) 
-.251 
(.216) 
prh -.007 
(.021) 
.018  
(.028) 
deltamp*prh 1.088** 
(.346) 
.665 
(.360) 
cons -.052** 
(.008) 
-.226** 
(.033) 
No. of obs. 4182 4182 
 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 2.20 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for the whole sample by the bootstrap 
estimation  
   Whole 
sample (GLS) 
Whole 
sample (FE) 
prh= 0.356 
 
(sample mean) -0.157% -0.014% 
prh= 0.123 
 
(10% decile) -0.411% -0.169% 
prh= 0.158 
 
(25% decile) -0.372% -0.146% 
prh= 0.309 
 
(50% decile) -0.208% -0.045% 
 Note: Different values of PRH are taken according to PRH’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of PRH sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 2.21  The bootstrap estimation results for Latin America subsample  
Variable Latin(GLS) Latin(FE) 
deltalnrgdp .971** 
(.184) 
.966** 
(.149) 
sizelag1 -.003  
(.003) 
-.096** 
(.024) 
liquiditylag1 .203** 
(.055) 
.611** 
(.101) 
capitalizationlag1 .017  
(.083) 
.615** 
(.238) 
deltamp -.481 
(.317) 
-.100  
(.219) 
prh -.036  
(.038) 
-.036  
(.044) 
deltamp*prh .887** 
(.486) 
.376 
(.343) 
cons -.042 
(.028) 
-.253** 
(.054) 
No. of obs. 1923 1923 
 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 2.22 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for Latin America subsample by the bootstrap 
estimation  
   Latin (GLS) Latin (FE) 
prh= 0.449 
 
(sample mean) -0.082% 0.069% 
prh= 0.188 
 
(10% decile) -0.314% -0.029% 
prh= 0.303 
 
(25% decile) -0.212% 0.014% 
prh= 0.390 
 
(50% decile) -0.135% 0.047% 
 Note: Different values of PRH are taken according to PRH’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of PRH sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 2.23  The bootstrap estimation results for Asia subsample  
Variable Asia(GLS) Asia(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.589** 
(.131) 
1.604** 
(.171) 
sizelag1 -.004**  
(.002) 
-.113** 
(.023) 
liquiditylag1 .250** 
(.051) 
.772** 
(.088) 
capitalizationlag1 -.290  
(.108) 
-.023  
(.200) 
deltamp -2.774** 
(.550) 
-2.534** 
(.545) 
prh .011  
(.019) 
.047**  
(.019) 
deltamp*prh 8.746** 
(1.535) 
8.163** 
(1.495) 
cons -.047** 
(.008) 
-.196** 
(.027) 
No. of obs. 2259 2259 
 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.24 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for Asia subsample by the bootstrap estimation  
   Asia (GLS) Asia (FE) 
prh= 0.271 
 
(sample mean) -0.400% -0.318% 
prh= 0.077 
 
(10% decile) -2.101% -1.906% 
prh= 0.124 
 
(25% decile) -1.692% -1.524% 
prh= 0.196 
 
(50% decile) -1.060% -0.934% 
 Note: Different values of PRH are taken according to PRH’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of PRH sample distribution are given in the 
table above. 
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Table 2.25 The bootstrap estimation results for large and small size banks  
Variable large 
size(GLS) 
large size(FE) Small 
size(GLS) 
Small 
size(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.182** 
(.110) 
1.070** 
(.123) 
1.361** 
(.176) 
1.487** 
(.198) 
sizelag1 -.019**  
(.003) 
-.118**  
(.022) 
-.019**  
(.009) 
-.151** 
(.033) 
liquiditylag1 .232** 
(.028) 
.512** 
(.083) 
.211** 
(.041) 
.836** 
(.119) 
capitalizationlag1 .161 
(.142) 
.733** 
(.243) 
-.106  
(.080) 
.241 
(.235) 
deltamp -.447* 
(.199) 
.037  
(.229) 
-.614**  
(.284) 
-.418  
(.280) 
prh .017  
(.020) 
.028  
(.027) 
-.050**  
(.029) 
-.006  
(.043) 
deltamp*prh 1.016** 
(.311) 
.232  
(.390) 
1.053**  
(.462) 
.773  
(.553) 
cons -.054** 
(.014) 
-.059  
(.049) 
-.059** 
(.011) 
-.435** 
(.057) 
No. of obs. 2152 2152 2030 2030 
 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 Small size and large size subsamples are separated by the median of size.  
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Table 2.26 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for large and small size banks by the bootstrap 
estimation  
   large size(GLS) large size(FE) 
prh= 0.365 
 
(sample mean) -0.076%             - 
prh= 0.123 
 
(10% decile) -0.323%             -      
prh= 0.175 
 
(25% decile) -0.270%             - 
prh= 0.319 
 
(50% decile) -0.123%             - 
   Small size(GLS) Small size(FE) 
prh= 0.347 
 
(sample mean) -0.249% -0.150% 
prh= 0.123 
 
(10% decile) -0.484% -0.323% 
prh= 0.158 
 
(25% decile) -0.447% -0.296% 
prh= 0.303 
 
(50% decile) -0.295% -0.184% 
 Note: Different values of PRH are taken according to PRH’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of PRH sample distribution are given in the 
table above.  
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Table 2.27  The bootstrap estimation results for high and low liquidity banks 
Variable high 
liquidity(GLS) 
high 
liquidity(FE) 
low 
liquidity(GLS) 
low 
liquidity(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.600** 
(.164) 
1.321** 
(.151) 
1.046** 
(.104) 
1.136** 
(.175) 
sizelag1 .005  
(.003) 
-.134** 
(.040) 
-.011** 
(.003) 
-.079** 
(.020) 
liquiditylag1 .452** 
(.052) 
.749** 
(.115) 
.567** 
(.095) 
.801** 
(.146) 
capitalizationlag1 -.085 
(.092) 
.259  
(.299) 
.050  
(.073) 
.566** 
(.222) 
deltamp -.438**  
(.160) 
-.256 
(.294) 
-.925** 
(.272) 
-.377  
(.340) 
prh -.012  
(.021) 
.015  
(.028) 
.049**  
(.017) 
.017  
(.043) 
deltamp*prh .991** 
(.358) 
.681  
(.573) 
1.524** 
(.413) 
.731  
(.534) 
cons -.190** 
(.025) 
-.317** 
(.070) 
-.103** 
(.016) 
-.188** 
(.036) 
No. of obs. 1987 1987 2195 2195 
 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 Low liquidity and high liquidity subsamples are separated by the median of liquidity.  
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Table 2.28 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change 
in the stance of monetary policy, for high and low liquidity banks by the 
bootstrap estimation  
   high liquidity(GLS) high liquidity(FE) 
prh= 0.411 
 
(sample mean) -0.031% 0.024% 
prh= 0.140 
 
(10% decile) -0.298% -0.160% 
prh= 0.266 
 
(25% decile) -0.174% -0.074% 
prh= 0.365 
 
(50% decile) -0.076% -0.007% 
   low liquidity(GLS) low liquidity(FE) 
prh= 0.306 
 
(sample mean) -0.458% -0.153% 
prh= 0.123 
 
(10% decile) -0.737% -0.288% 
prh= 0.124 
 
(25% decile) -0.736% -0.287% 
prh= 0.250 
 
(50% decile) -0.544% -0.195% 
 Note: Different values of PRH are taken according to PRH’s distribution, so the 
sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles of PRH sample distribution are given in the 
table above. 
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Table 2.29  The bootstrap estimation results for high and low capitalization banks 
Variable high 
capitalization(GLS) 
high 
capitalization(FE) 
low 
capitalization(GLS) 
low 
capitalization(FE) 
deltalnrgdp 1.364** 
(.111 
1.367** 
(.175) 
1.115** 
(.138) 
.885** 
(.192) 
sizelag1 .002  
(.005) 
-.091**  
(.025) 
-.013** 
(.003) 
-.142** 
(.027) 
liquiditylag1 .234** 
(.046) 
.724** 
(.095) 
.230** 
(.033) 
.497** 
(.100) 
capitalizationlag1 .049  
(.072) 
.444** 
(.224) 
.866** 
(.440) 
.422 
(.599) 
deltamp -.534** 
(.233) 
-.305 
(.246) 
-.382  
(.481) 
.496  
(.477) 
prh -.004  
(.032) 
-.059 
(.053) 
.025  
(.031) 
.089** 
(.028) 
deltamp*prh 1.055** 
(.429) 
.629 
(.497) 
.890  
(.718) 
-.476 
(.706) 
cons -.102** 
(.019) 
-.316** 
(.047) 
-.089** 
(.018) 
-.093** 
(.043) 
No. of obs. 2065 2065 2117 2117 
 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Low capitalization and high capitalization subsamples are separated by the median of capitalization.  
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Table 2.30 Percentage change in lending as a result of a percentage point change in the stance of monetary policy, 
for high capitalization banks by the bootstrap estimation  
   high 
capitalization(GLS) 
high 
capitalization(FE) 
prh= 0.420 
 
(sample mean) -0.091% -0.041% 
prh= 0.155 
 
(10% decile) -0.370% -0.207% 
prh= 0.299 
 
(25% decile) -0.218% -0.117% 
prh= 0.365 
 
(50% decile) -0.149% -0.075% 
 Note: Different values of PRH are taken according to PRH’s distribution, so the sample mean, 10%, 25%, and 50% deciles 
of PRH sample distribution are given in the table above.  
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Table 3. 1  Number of banks  
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina 80 67 67 64 63 58 45 40 42 47 43 
Brazil 87 74 73 63 68 73 71 60 62 55 40 
Colombia 28 29 26 21 22 24 25 25 24 16 15 
India 61 57 62 61 60 58 58 54 57 53 46 
Indonesia 65 37 44 39 29 38 35 43 42 42 35 
Japan 148 148 144 139 137 133 130 125 127 124 124 
Malaysia 34 29 31 28 20 21 22 23 21 23 21 
Paraguay 10 12 19 20 20 20 14 13 12 12 12 
Peru 22 15 19 12 15 12 12 11 12 10 11 
Philippines 20 22 25 22 24 26 31 32 17 21 23 
Singapore 15 14 12 12 13 11 8 10 8 10 8 
Thailand 18 19 18 15 16 17 17 17 15 15 17 
Uruguay 11 13 17 17 34 30 21 26 21 15 21 
Venezuela 14 20 21 39 34 31 21 18 19 13 9 
Source: Bankscope from Bureau van Dijk and IBCA. 
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Table 3. 2   Summary Statistics for the whole sample 
Variable    Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
 interest income  593.39  2145.58  0.02 71146.59 
 interest expense  326.66 1371.79 0.0004 55418.46 
 other income  134.00 540.66 0.0006 9868.28 
 administrative expense  135.42 505.52 0.02 11271.43 
 total deposit mmf  13052.22 62674.46 0.01 1202877.70 
 personnel expense  100.27 313.37 0.02 8070.20 
 loans  10302.01 45751.29 0.61 951541.70 
 total assets  17180.04 76812.16 1.60 1413755.91 
 total deposit  13727.05 60059.17 0.01 1090128.93 
ratio of net loans to asset  52.74% 20.76% 0.01% 99.98% 
FOS  29% 22% 0% 87% 
PRH  0.45 0.23 -0.20 1.07 
 HHI  1139 526 522 3053 
CR3  48% 13% 28% 96% 
CR5  62% 13% 36% 99% 
Note: The unit is million 2000 US dollar. Data are real variables. 
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Table 3. 3  Summary Statistics for Asia sample 
 Variable    Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
 interest income   807.68 2711.20   0.02 71146.59 
 interest expense   411.72   1716.04   0.004 55418.46 
 other income 190.43   675.22 0.01 9868.28 
 administrative expense 194.27 653.22 0.09 11271.43 
 total deposit mmf 22284.33  83070.22 0.06 1202877.70 
 personnel expense 132.18 336.96   0.09 4800.64 
 loans 16689.62 58601.17 3.28 951541.70 
 total assets 27512.12 98407.13 4.08 1413755.91 
 total deposit 21995.63 76539.92 0.01 1090128.93 
 ratio of net loans to asset   57.33% 17.75% 0.01% 99.98% 
FOS 12%   13% 0% 44% 
PRH 0.38 0.24 -0.20 1.07 
 HHI 1075 569 522 3053 
CR3 48% 15% 32% 96% 
CR5 62% 15% 42% 99% 
Note: The unit is million 2000 US dollar. Data are real variables. 
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Table 3. 4   Summary Statistics for Latin America sample 
 Variable    Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
 interest income 330.92 1055.90 0.06 20799.77 
 interest expense 221.98   744.48 0.0004 13894.01 
 other income 64.51   286.61 0.001 6789.25 
 administrative expense 63.03 188.70 0.02 2309.95 
 total deposit mmf   1660.30   5111.79 0.01   91612.50 
 personnel expense    61.10 276.78 0.02 8070.20 
 loans 1053.36 2739.59 0.61 33945.33 
 total assets 2220.19 6662.40 1.60 121963.98 
 total deposit 1461.15 4075.29 0.01 59272.57 
ratio of net loans to asset 47.07% 22.72%   0.03% 99.72% 
FOS 41% 18% 2% 87% 
PRH 0.49 0.22 0.11 1.04 
 HHI 1186 490 553 2769 
CR3 48% 12% 28% 80% 
CR5 63% 12% 36% 91% 
Note: The unit is million 2000 US dollar. Data are real variables.
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Table 3. 5 The estimation results for the whole sample, Dependent variable: 
PRH, Concentration measure: HHI  
Variable FE estimation GLS estimation 
HHIlag -1.601*** 
(.539) 
-1.267** 
(.563) 
-1.511** 
(.696) 
-1.651*** 
(.460) 
-1.184** 
(.501) 
- 1.636*** 
(.598) 
GDP per 
capita 
 -.586*  
(.315) 
-.415  
(.344) 
 -.423**  
(.199) 
-.407**  
(.198) 
inflation  .026  
(.272) 
.026  
(.291) 
 .097  
(.221) 
.039  
(.229) 
size   -.013  
(.048) 
  -.023**  
(.041) 
liquidity   .376  
(.325 
  .192 
(.241) 
capitalization   -.009  
(.921) 
  .218  
(.787) 
Foreign bank 
penetration 
  -.168  
(.210) 
  -.267*  
(.157) 
cons .626*** 
(.070) 
6.776 ** 
(3.317) 
5.025  
(3.614) 
.535*** 
(.058) 
4.271**  
(1.762) 
4.238**  
(1.767) 
R2 0.17 0.21 0.23    
No. of obs. 111 111 111 111 111 111 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3. 6 The estimation results for the whole sample, Dependent variable: 
PRH, Concentration measure: CR3  
Variable FE estimation GLS estimation 
CR3lag -.427* 
(.223) 
-.278 
(.228) 
-.303 
(.290) 
-.479** 
(.197) 
-.276 
(.203) 
-.358 
(.246) 
GDP per 
capita 
  -.701** 
(.318) 
-.563  
(.345) 
 -.542*** 
(.193) 
-.516***  
(.197) 
inflation  -.015  
(.277) 
-.055  
(.294) 
 .043  
(.223) 
-.040  
(.233) 
size   -.028  
(.049) 
  -.038 
(.042) 
liquidity   .419  
(.338) 
  .248  
(.254) 
capitalization   -.143  
(1.007) 
  .082 
(.860) 
Foreign bank 
penetration 
  -.035  
(.205) 
  -.141  
(.151) 
cons .665*** 
(.111) 
7.999**  
(3.338) 
6.561*  
(3.621) 
.581*** 
(.088) 
5.346***  
(1.700) 
5.207***  
(1.759) 
R2 0.13 0.18 0.20    
No. of obs. 111 111 111 111 111 111 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3. 7  The estimation results for the whole sample, Dependent variable: 
PRH, Concentration measure: CR5  
Variable FE estimation GLS estimation 
CR5lag -.271*** 
(.253) 
-.114*** 
(.255) 
-.092* 
(.327) 
-.374* 
(.217) 
-.112 
(.224) 
-.175 
(.280) 
GDP per 
capita 
  -.778 
(.316) 
-.639  
(.344) 
 -.597*** 
(.196) 
-.546*** 
(.202) 
inflation  -.029  
(.279) 
-.071  
(.296) 
 .034  
(.225) 
-.051  
(.236) 
size   -.036 
(.048) 
  -.047 
(.041) 
liquidity   .383  
(.348) 
  .226  
(.273) 
capitalization   -.483  
(1.027) 
  -.252  
(.868) 
Foreign bank 
penetration 
  .028  
(.204) 
  -.098  
(.152) 
cons .635*** 
(.158) 
8.757  
(3.311) 
7.322  
(3.598) 
.597*** 
(.123) 
5.787***  
(1.710) 
5.482***  
(1.794) 
R2 0.10 0.16 0.19    
No. of obs. 111 111 111 111 111 111 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3. 8 The estimation results for the Asian sample and the Latin American sample, Dependent variable: PRH, 
Concentration measure: HHI  
Variable                             
(FE)                        (GLS) 
Asia  
(FE)                          (GLS) 
Latin America  
HHIlag -2.325*  
(1.223) 
-2.530*** 
(1.000) 
-1.455*  
(.864) 
-1.973***  
(.740) 
GDP per capita -.570  
(.831) 
-.579**  
(.267) 
.009  
(.519) 
.203  
(.349) 
inflation -.512 
(.408) 
-.434 
(.325) 
1.582***  
(.496) 
.841**  
(.355) 
size -.081 
(.087) 
-.052 
(.073) 
-.052  
(.062) 
-.028 
(.053) 
liquidity .967* 
(.516) 
.464  
(.357) 
.658  
(.588) 
-.171  
(.337) 
capitalization 3.271 
(2.212) 
1.067 
(1.910) 
-1.218  
(1.095) 
-.466  
(.858) 
Foreign bank 
penetration 
-.092 
(.451) 
.016  
(.389) 
-.438  
(.266) 
-.264  
(.169) 
cons 7.130 
(9.970) 
6.433 
(2.700) 
.656 
(4.767) 
-1.001 
(3.163) 
R2 0.59  0.39  
No. of obs. 50 50 61 61 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3. 9  The estimation results for the Asian sample and the Latin American sample, Dependent variable: PRH, 
Concentration measure: CR3 
Variable                             
(FE)                        (GLS) 
Asia  
(FE)                          (GLS) 
Latin America  
CR3lag -.749**  
(.344) 
-.577** 
(.306) 
-.627  
(.575) 
-.679  
(.479) 
GDP per capita -.617  
(.817) 
-.667**  
(.268) 
.031  
(.606) 
.059  
(.387) 
inflation -.734* 
(.405) 
-.556 
(.343) 
1.759***  
(.565) 
.832**  
(.398) 
size -.092 
(.085) 
-.064 
(.075) 
-.071  
(.062) 
-.048 
(.055) 
liquidity 1.231** 
(.513) 
.563  
(.382) 
.748  
(.596) 
-.037  
(.359) 
capitalization 3.743*  
(2.205) 
1.158  
(1.973) 
-.879  
(1.411) 
-.189  
(1.170) 
Foreign bank 
penetration 
-.076 
(.434) 
.093  
(.397) 
-.426  
(.275) 
-.161 
(.170) 
cons 7.745  
(9.803) 
7.329*** 
(2.716) 
.533  
(5.517) 
.321  
(3.486) 
R2 0.61  0.37  
No. of obs. 50 50 61 61 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3. 10  The estimation results for the Asian sample and the Latin American sample, Dependent variable: PRH, 
Concentration measure: CR5   
Variable                             
(FE)                        (GLS) 
Asia  
(FE)                          (GLS) 
Latin America  
CR5lag -1.036**  
(.507) 
-.703 
(.443) 
-.290  
(.520) 
-.364  
(.394) 
GDP per capita -.696  
(.827) 
-.630**  
(.279) 
-.188  
(.592) 
-.094  
(.364) 
inflation -.888** 
(.429) 
-.638* 
(.367) 
1.583***  
(.543) 
.673* 
(.373) 
size -.121 
(.087) 
-.080 
(.076) 
-.088  
(.060) 
-.069 
(.056) 
liquidity 1.472** 
(.551) 
.728*  
(.440) 
.757  
(.614) 
-.062  
(.365) 
capitalization 3.897*  
(2.248) 
1.184  
(2.004) 
-1.511 
(1.287) 
-.866  
(.992) 
Foreign bank 
penetration 
.066 
(.422) 
.208  
(.392) 
-.385  
(.276) 
-.138  
(.172) 
cons 8.908  
(9.940) 
7.024 ** 
(2.803) 
2.569  
(5.315) 
1.757 
(3.255) 
R2 0.60  0.36  
No. of obs. 50 50 61 61 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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                                                 Appendix of Figures 
 
                       Figure 1. 1 Time trend for key variables per country 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables. 
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Note: Loans and total assets are in local currency and the units of them are in millions.  
Data are real variables.                                                         
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